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________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 1   
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT   
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.0    INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Many of the development gains arising from international trade depend on the ability of 
developing countries to respond to existing as well as new opportunities in foreign 
markets. This ability is however, adversely affected by market-access related issues in 
developed countries and difficulties in meeting market entry conditions set in the 
importing countries. 
 
For many developing countries, integration into the world economy means being able to 
meet those market entry conditions such as the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
standards and creating the necessary conditions for competitiveness and development. 
The inability to do so which is frequently the case implies that these conditions often 
become entry barriers with protectionist effects. Some of the SPS standards are difficult 
to overcome even for the European Union and the United States in each other’s markets. 
Thus the difficulty of market entry barriers for developing countries can only be 
multiplied given the latter’ s less capacity and sophistication as regards the scientific and 
technological development among other factors.1 
 
In light of this is the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement,2 which came into 
effect on the same date as the WTO.3 The SPS Agreement’ s main aim is to maintain the 
                                                 
1 UNCTAD, (2003) “Market Access, Market competitiveness”,  
Available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/cid65_en.pdf (accessed on 20 April 2006).   
2 Agreement on the Application of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, GATT Doc.TN/FA-AIA-4, 
adopted 15 December 1993, in the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, adopted on the 15 December 1993, 33 I.L.M9 (1994). 
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sovereign right of any government or country to produce the level of health protection it 
deems appropriate while at the same time ensure that these sovereign rights are not 
abused or misused for protectionist purposes4 and not to result into unnecessary barriers 
to international trade.5 
 
The SPS Agreement allows countries to set their own SPS standards which have to be 
scientifically justifiable.6 The SPS measures should only be applied to the extent 
necessary to protect human, animal and plant life or health. They should also not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar 
conditions prevail.7 
 
By way of harmonisation of the SPS standards, member states are encouraged to use 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist.8 The 
recognised international organisations are the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), 
the International Office of Epizootics (IOE) for animal health and zoonoses and the 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under the auspices of 
the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention.9  
 
However, members may use measures which result in higher standards if there is 
scientific justification.10 They can also set higher standards based on appropriate 
assessment of risks so long as the approach is consistent, and not arbitrary.11 But at the 
same time, in case need arises, for example, where there is an outbreak of a dangerous 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 www.wto.org (Accessed on 20 April 2006) The SPS Agreement was one of the several Trade Agreements 
signed by the then GATT members at MARRAKESH on the 15th April 1994 in order to give effect to the 
formation of the WTO which came into effect on the 1st January 2006. 
4 Oyejide, A T Ogunkola, EO & Bankole, S.A (2000) “Quantifying the trade impact of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards: What is known is issues of importance to the Sub-Saharan Africa” University of 
Ibadan, 3. 
5 SPS Agreement, Article 2.3. 
6 SPS Agreement, Article 2.2.  
7 SPS Agreement, Article 2.3. 
8 Jackson, J.H., & Sykes, A., (Eds.) (1997) Implementing the Uruguay Round, Claredon Press, Oxford 
Univeristy Press,10. 
9 SPS Agreement, Item 3 of Annex A. 
10 SPS Agreement, Article 3.3.  
11 The WTO Secretariat, “Understanding the WTO”, 3rd Ed, September 2003, p.32 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf (Accessed on 20 April 2006). 
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disease like the Avian Influenza (Bird flu) or pests, a country is allowed to apply a 
provisional precautionary principle to deal with scientific uncertainty.12  
 
The agreement still allows countries to use different standards and different methods of 
inspecting products.13 Where an exporting country can demonstrate that the measures it 
applies to its exports achieve the same level of health protection as in the importing 
country, then the importing country is expected to accept the exporting country’s 
standards and methods.14  
 
Much as the sanitary standards arising from the SPS Agreement can facilitate trade by 
clearly defining product characteristics, and improving compatibility and usability,15 as 
well as advancing domestic social goals like the public health by establishing minimum 
standards or prescribing safety requirements, they are, however, sometimes used to hide 
protectionist policies.16 
 
Whereas developing countries continue to point ‘suspicious fingers’ toward developed 
ones, that the latter are using SPS measures as a protectionist tool, it is important to find 
out whether the developing countries are not the ones failing on their part to fulfil the 
minimum required standards due to lack of technological advancement and skill among a 
combination of other factors. 
 
1.1     OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
 
a) To study some of the forms of recognised health safety measures 
established under the SPS Agreement. 
b) To fully understand the input of the SPS Agreement as regards 
international trade. 
                                                 
12 SPS Agreement, Article 5.7. However, the precautionary principle has not yet crystallised into a 
recognised principle of public international law, though, applied in environmental law.   
13 The WTO Secretariat, “Understanding the WTO”, 3rd Edition September 2003, p.32. 
14 SPS Agreement, Article 4. 
15 SPS and TBT Summary, University of Harvard, available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/spstbt.html (accessed on the 15th on April 2006)  
16 Michalopous, C (2001) “Developing Countries in the WTO” Hampshire: Palgrave, 112. 
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c) To explore the role of the various organisations such as the Codex 
Alimetarius Commission (CAC), International Office of Epizootics (IOE) 
and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in the 
implementation of the SPS standards. 
d) To find out how the application of the SPS standards has affected 
international trade more particularly in the Sub-Saharan African 
Countries’ perspective. 
e) To find out whether it is not the Developing Countries’ failure to meet the 
minimum safety standards as well as being in compliance thereof. 
1.2     SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study shall serve mainly a dual purpose of exploring the impact of the application of 
the SPS Agreement on international trade as a whole but in more particular in relation to 
the Sub-Saharan African countries as well as at the same time find out whether it is not 
the Developing Countries’ failure on their part to fulfil the minimum required SPS 
standards. 
 
1.3     METHODOLOGY 
 
This study shall basically be a literature with emphasis on an analysis of the relevant 
available literature on the impact of the SPS Agreement and measures on international 
trade. The primary sources shall include domestic legislations of selected SSA countries, 
International instruments, declarations, and WTO disputes regarding the SPS Agreement 
as well as textbooks on the subject matter. On the secondary sources, reference shall be 
taken from various background papers, books and scholarly articles as well as Internet 
websites for up-to-date information. 
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1.4     SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
A lot of work has been done regarding the SPS Agreement and its impact on international 
trade, though not so conclusive. This study however, is going to deal specifically with an 
assessment of the impact of the SPS Agreement to the SSA countries, by analysing the 
balance between protection of human, animal and plant life or health on the one hand, 
and promotion of international trade in this region. 
 
1.6     CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
The mini-thesis shall be divided into five main chapters, chapter one being the 
introduction (the proposal) containing the statement problem, objectives and 
methodology of the study. Then chapter two dealing with the evolution and development 
of the SPS Agreement and a brief overview of the SPS Agreement, then chapter three 
shall cover the application of the provisions of the SPS Agreement and the WTO Dispute 
Settlements about the SPS, chapter four assessing the effect of the SPS Agreement on 
international trade as regards the Sub- Sahara African countries and lastly 
recommendations and conclusions shall follow thereafter. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 2  
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE SPS AGREEMENT 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The SPS Agreement provides the WTO member countries with a ‘qualified’ right to 
apply measures necessary to protect human, animal and plant life or health. The sanitary 
measures are the ones that deal with the protection of human and animal health and life, 
while phytosanitary measures are aimed at the protection of plant life and health.17 
However the SPS Agreement does not establish any particular sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure per se, but, it just establishes a number of requirements and procedures to ensure 
that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure is in fact intended to protect against the risk 
asserted, rather than to serve as a barrier to trade.18 The SPS Agreement recognizes that 
countries have the right to maintain SPS measures for the protection of their population 
and the agricultural sector. However, it requires them to base their SPS measures on 
scientific principles19 and not to use them as disguised restrictions to international trade.20 
 
In order to achieve its objective, the SPS Agreement encourages members to use 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist.21 The 
international standards envisaged are those that are set by the international organisations 
such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), the International Office of 
Epizootics (IOE) and the Organisations established under the International Plant 
                                                 
17 Bhala, R. (2 Ed, 2000) International Trade Law: Theory and Practice, Lexis Publishing Limited, New 
York 1665 
18 Ibid. 
19 SPS Agreement, Article 2.2. 
20 SPS Agreement, Article 5.5. 
21 Das, BL (1999) The World Trade Organisation: A guide to the new Framework for International Trade, 
Zed Books, 133.  
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Protection Convention.22 Nevertheless, members may adopt SPS measures which result 
in higher levels of health protection or measures for health concerns for which 
international standards do not exist provided that they are scientifically justifiable.23 
Science may, however, play an important role in the determination of a particular SPS 
measure, but economic and political issues determine when, how and where to apply24 
them. 
2.1    Application of the SPS Agreement: Is it an agricultural agreement? 
 
The SPS Agreement covers product standards, which apply equally to domestic and 
imported products, and health-related import restrictions25 and it is not limited only to 
risks posed by agricultural products, but also extends to all measures regarding the 
protection of human, animal and plant health and/or life.26 Thus it could be argued 
contrary to the general perception, that the SPS Agreement only covers agricultural 
products. It could be that most of the risks to human, animal and plant life relate to 
agricultural products, but it is not absolutely correct that the SPS Agreement only covers 
the agricultural sector. This has been illustrated by the Panel decision in the EC- Bio-
Tech case,27 that the SPS Agreement has a broad scope. For example for as long as a 
measure is aimed at the protection of human life and health, then the SPS Agreement 
would automatically apply irrespective of other measures. In that case, the EU had 
claimed that its measures were concerned with the protection of the environment and thus 
the SPS Agreement could not apply.  
                                                 
22 Jackson, H.J., & Sykes, A (1997) Implementing the Uruguay Round (Eds.), Claredon Press, Oxford, 10. 
Item 3 Annex A of the SPS Agreement also provides for the three organisations as the organisations upon 
whose standards, member states have to base their SPS standards. Any measure which is in conformity 
with the standards set by those organisations is considered an internationally recognised standard 
23 Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is to the effect that as long as a country can scientifically justify a 
measure, it can go ahead to maintain a measure which is higher than what is set by an international 
organisation.    
24 Roberts, D (1998) “The Preliminary Effects of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade 
Regulations”, Journal of International Economic Law, 378. As shall be discussed later in chapter 3, 
economic or political considerations can only be referred to during determination of risk to animals and 
plants and not for human’s life or health. 
25 Schultz, J. “The GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment: Toward 
Environmental Reform” The American Journal of International Law, p. 551. 
26 Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that the SPS agreement applies to all sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade.  
27 European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS.291.292.293/R. 
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In order to fully understand the application of the SPS Agreement, it is imperative to first 
go through the situation before the SPS Agreement came into effect.   
2.2    Situation before the SPS Agreement 
 
Initially, the multilateral disciplines28 for the protection of human, animal and plant life 
or health were bestowed in Article XX (b) of the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) 1947.29 It provided that a member state may apply necessary measures to 
protect human, animal or plant health or life if such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail or as a disguised restriction on international 
trade. 
  
On the other hand, GATT member states used other GATT trade rules to facilitate trade. 
For example, Article 1 of the GATT, the most favoured nation clause (MFN principle) 
required non-discriminatory treatment of imported products from different foreign 
suppliers30 and Article III required that such products be treated no less favourably than 
similar domestically produced goods, with respect to any regulations.  
 
It should, however, be noted that much as the MFN and National Treatment principles are 
applicable to all member countries, the provisions of Article XX (b) of the GATT 1947, 
was and is still an exception to the said trading principles as long as countries could 
justifiably meet the conditions set down in its chapeau.31 Also, the most favoured nation 
principle does not allow an importing member to discriminate against member states’ 
like-products. 
                                                 
28 Multilateral Agreements refer to agreements that are applicable to the entire WTO system. As long as a 
country becomes a member of WTO, then such a multilateral agreement becomes applicable automatically. 
Reference should be made to footnote 38 for the definition of plurilateral agreements.  
29 Das, BL (1999) The World Trade Organisation: A guide to the new Framework for International Trade, 
Zed Books, 131  
30 Horn, H & Petros C. Mavroids (2001) 17 “Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most Favoured Nation 
Clause” The European Journal of Political Economy, 233. 
31 The Chapeau to Article, XX of the GATT provides that, “Subject to the requirement that such measures 
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures”. 
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Having discussed the situation before the SPS agreement, it is significant for the purpose 
of this discussion to trace the history and development of the SPS Agreement in order to 
understand the role of the SPS measures in international trade. 
2.2.1     Development of the SPS Agreement 
 
The broad scope accorded to sanitary measures under Article XX was necessary to 
maintain public support for the GATT as a system and for the various member countries. 
No democratic government could properly disregard policies necessary to protect its 
citizens’ health and that of its agricultural and animal production sectors.32 However, 
difficulty arose as to how countries could ensure that same or similar standards of health 
and sanitary protection were applied at each other’s borders. There was nothing in Article 
XX that created a standard definition of the word “necessary” as expressed, in Article XX 
(b).33 This caused some tension among GATT members and alerted them that something 
needed to be done to harmonise the health standards. 
2.2.2    Threat of Non-Tariff Barriers 
 
Following GATT’s successful reduction of tariffs as barriers to international trade, many 
countries feared that the use of one or another of the non-tariff barriers would obviously 
circumvent those beneficial results.34 Thus later on, members recognised during the 
Uruguay Round that as trade barriers in the form of tariffs were reduced, domestic 
agricultural lobbies as well as some governments would resort to non-tariff barriers such 
as the sanitary and phytosanitary measures35 to keep food and agricultural products out of 
their markets. 
 
                                                 
32 Thomson, A P (2002) 33 “Salmon and Compliance Issues Surrounding the SPS Agreement, Sovereign 
Acceptance and Measure of Adaptation”, Law and Policy in International Business, p.8 
33 Desta, GM (2002) The Law of Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1949 to the WTO Agreement 
on agriculture, Kluwer Law International, p.17. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Croome, J (1999) Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements, Kluwer Law International, 62 
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The problem of non-tariff barriers was the most crucial challenge for the multilateral 
trading system since the Kennedy Round36 (1964-1967) as it was later observed in 1970 
that;  
 
“If the only thing at stake were high tariffs, one’s judgment could be more 
generous…unfortunately for the prestige of the GATT, however, the most important 
restrictions on international trade in temperate agricultural commodities are non-tariff 
barriers, and a large proportion of these are maintained in blatant violation of the General 
Agreement. The continued violation of the terms of the General Agreement by substantial 
number of contracting parties has become such a way of life that little embarrassment 
seems to be felt by national representatives and no effort is made to suggest dates on 
which violations might be terminated.”37 
2.2.3   The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) 
 
During the Tokyo Round there was a major breakthrough in the field of non-tariff 
barriers. A number of trade agreements were concluded. Most of them were plurilateral,38 
which later on became multilateral agreements after the WTO’s coming into effect. Such 
agreements included subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade 
(the standards code of 1979), import licensing procedures, government procurement, and 
customs valuation.39 However the area of sanitary and health standards was left out of the 
agenda, mainly because on the one hand, it was perceived to be covered under the 
standards code of 1979 which later on became the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT Agreement).40 Although this agreement was not developed primarily for the 
purpose of regulating sanitary and phytosanitary measures, it covered technical 
                                                 
36 The Kennedy Round was in the aftermath of the assassination of the American President, John F. 
Kennedy. It went on between 1964-1967, but it was more focused on the elimination of tariff barriers to 
trade.  
37 Desta, GM (2002) The Law of Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1949 to the WTO Agreement 
on agriculture, Kluwer Law International, p.22. 
38 Plurilateral Agreements refer to those agreements which are of minority interest. Only few members are 
party to such agreements. Examples include, the agreements on trade in civil aircraft and government 
procurement. The opposite of plurilateral is multilateral, see an explanation in footnote 28.  
39 Desta, GM (2002) The Law of Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1949 to the WTO Agreement 
on agriculture, Kluwer Law International, p.22. 
40 The TBT Agreement was initially a plurilateral agreement known as the Standards Code but after the 
WTO coming into effect, it became a multilateral agreement.  
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requirements resulting from food safety and animal and plant health measures, including 
pesticide residue limits, inspection requirements and labelling.41 As such, countries 
continued to rely on the ambiguous provisions of Article XX (b) of the GATT as well as 
the TBT agreement for the protection of life and health. 
2.2.4    The Uruguay Round (UR) 
Before the conclusion of the UR, rules governing the SPS measures had not yet been 
elaborated in a multilateral agreement,42 but they were covered by the GATT Article XX 
(b). Thus at the time the Uruguay Round commenced, there was a general consensus on 
part of the negotiating countries that this was the appropriate time for reform of 
international agricultural trade. This sentiment was reiterated in the Punta del Este 
Declaration, which launched the U R in September 1986, which called for increased 
disciplines in three areas of the agricultural sector;  
• Market access;  
• Direct and indirect subsidies; and  
• Sanitary and phytosanitary measures.43 
The text of the Punta Del Este Ministerial Declaration, within the context of agriculture, 
stated:  
“Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring 
all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the general 
principles governing the negotiations, by: minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary 
and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into 
account the relevant international agreements".44 [Emphasis added] 
                                                 
41 WTO Secretariat (1998) “Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” 
Available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm (Accessed 20 May 2006). 
42 Bhala, R. (2Ed, 2000) International Trade Law: Theory and Practice, Lexis Publishing Limited, 1665. 
43Griffin, R (1999) “Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture” A Resource Manual, FAO Corporate 
Document Repository. Available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7354e/x7354e01.htm (accessed 1 July 
2006). 
44 Griffin, R., (1999) “Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture” A Resource Manual, FAO Corporate 
Document Repository. Available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7354e/x7354e01.htm  (Accessed on 
1of July 2006). 
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It suffices to point out at this stage that the SPS measures at the time were discussed as a 
branch of the agricultural sector. This is clearly illustrated from the language of the 
negotiators at the commencement of the UR as well as during the entire negotiations as 
they were unfolding.  
2.2.5    SPS Negotiations 
The SPS negotiations initially began as an attempt to elaborate on the provisions of 
Article XX (b) of the GATT45 and the TBT agreement. The negotiators sought to develop 
a multilateral system that would allow simplification and harmonization of SPS 
measures, as well as elimination of all restrictions that lack any valid scientific basis.46 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, the EC, Japan, New Zealand, the Nordic Countries and the 
United States led the SPS negotiations. 
Zarrilli summarised the positions of different countries at the start of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations47 as follows:  
• Firstly the United States and the European Communities (EC) were proposing 
broad harmonization efforts, based upon the expertise of international 
organizations.  
• Second, the EC was calling for all standards to be based on scientific evidence.  
• Thirdly, the Cairns Group48 endorsed the broad recommendations toward 
harmonization proposed by the EC and the United States. However, regarding the 
determination of what would be an acceptable level of sanitary and phytosanitary 
risk, it suggested that the burden of justification of SPS measures should be 
placed upon the importing country.  
                                                 
45 Bhala, R  (2nd Ed, 2000) International Trade Law: Theory and Practice, Lexis Publishing Limited, 1666 
46 Saqib, M., (2005) “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in South Asia”, South Asian Yearbook of Trade 
and Development”, 293. 
47 Zarrilli, S (1999) “The Agreement on the Application of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures: Issues 
for Developing Countries”, p.1 Available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/snp/snp-04.htm 
(accessed 15 August 2006). 
48 At the time of the UR negotiations was comprised of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay. The 
composition of the Group has changed meanwhile, since South Africa has joined while Hungary left. 
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• Japan supported harmonization efforts based upon the work of international 
organizations; the improvement of notification and consultation procedures and of 
the dispute settlement mechanism; and special allowances for developing 
countries.49 
• Some other countries such as Japan supported the idea that international 
standardization bodies should develop guidelines rather than standards, thus 
providing member states with more flexibility in drafting their own SPS 
regulations. This is now reflected in Article 3.3 of the Agreement that allows 
countries to deviate from the internationally recognised grounds as long as the 
standards they set are scientifically justifiable. 
• But as for the Developing Countries, they strongly advocated for the removal of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures that acted as non-tariff barriers to trade by 
supporting international harmonization of SPS measures to prevent developed 
countries from imposing arbitrarily strict standards.50  
The history in the negotiating positions is crucial as is reflected today as to where each 
country falls with regard to the SPS measures. For example, the EU being stricter and 
Japan more liberal in its application of the SPS measures. However, for most of the 
developing countries, have not yet shifted from the fact that they want the measures to be 
extremely lenient. This is mainly because of their lack of resources to meet some of the 
stringent measures set by developed countries, a factor which denies SSA the ability to 
export to developed countries’ markets.   
2.2.6     The Mid-term review of the UR. 
In December 1988, during the Mid-Term Review of the UR, it was agreed that the 
priorities in the area of SPS were; international harmonization of SPS measures, 
development of an effective notification process for national regulations; improvement of 
                                                 
49 Zarrilli, S (1999) “The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: 
Issues for Developing Countries.”  Trade Related Agenda, Development & Equity, (T.R.A.D.E), South 
Centre, p.1 Available at http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/sps/resources/international/dc-issues.pdf (Accessed 
on 10 June 2006). 
50 Ibid.  
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the dispute settlement process; and provision of the necessary input of scientific expertise 
and judgement, relying on relevant international organizations.51 
2.2.7      The Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures 
In 1988, the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations was established 
which later on produced a draft text in November 1990.52 Both the Mid- Term review and 
Working group findings were centred on the principles of the GATT, like the Most 
Favoured Nation principle, National treatment and transparency.53 Thus the SPS 
Agreement is based on the same principles, as all other agreements under the GATT, and 
should be interpreted from that context. 
2.2.8     The Dunkel Report: A break through? 
 
Due to the failure of the UR to meet its deadline, the Director General of the GATT in 
December 1991 ordered for the making of the "Dunkel Draft". The draft included inter 
alia proposals on sanitary and phytosanitary issues, which closely followed the draft text 
produced by the Working Group in November 1990, but it provided for more stringent 
national regulations and excluding economic considerations. The final text of the 
Agreement on the SPS Measures that was approved at the end of the Uruguay Round was 
largely based on the Dunkel text.54 But at the same time it incorporates some of the 
international trade principles found in the other WTO agreements. Thus the need to 
differentiate the SPS Agreement from other GATT Agreements.  
 
                                                 
51 Zarrilli, S (1999) “The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: 
Issues for Developing Countries.”  Trade Related Agenda, Development & Equity, (T.R.A.D.E), South 
Centre, p.4 Available at http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/sps/resources/international/dc-issues.pdf (Accessed 
on 10 June 2006). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Zarrilli, S (1999) “The Agreement on the Application of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures: Issues 
for Developing Countries”, p.1 Available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/snp/snp-04.htm 
(Accessed 15 August 2006). 
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2.3     Relation of the SPS Agreement with other WTO Agreements 
 
Before going into details of the SPS Agreement, a brief comparison of the agreement to 
other WTO agreements is necessary. Among the agreements that relate to the SPS 
Agreement include; the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs, and the Agreement on Agriculture.  
2.3.1   The SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreements 
 
The jurisdictional delineation between the SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreements is often obscure.55 Although the SPS Agreement and the TBT are almost 
similar in content, they differ in scope. The SPS Agreement applies to measures the 
purpose of which are to protect human, animal and plant life and health56 while the TBT 
Agreement covers all regulations and voluntary standards, and the procedures to ensure 
that standards are met, save for when they are SPS measures.57  
 
The provisions of the TBT Agreement compared to the SPS Agreement are less strict58 
because member countries can decide that international standards are inappropriate for a 
number of other reasons, which are not found in the SPS Agreement, such as national 
security.59 The determination of which WTO Agreement covers a measure is of particular 
importance, as it shall be shown during a discussion in chapter three. 
 
In addition, in order to determine which of the two agreements applies to a measure, it is 
important to look at the exclusion articles of both Agreements. Article 1.4 of the SPS 
Agreement provides that nothing in the agreement shall affect the rights of members 
under the TBT Agreement with regard to measures, which fall within the scope of the 
TBT Agreement. Yet more clearly, article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement provides that the 
provisions of the TBT Agreement do not apply to Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures as 
                                                 
55 Ahn, D, (2002) 8,3 “A comparative Analysis of the SPS Agreements”, International Trade Law and 
Regulation, 85. 
56 Art. 1.1 SPS Agreement. 
57 Art. 1.5 of the TBT Agreement. 
58 UNCTAD, Course on dispute settlement 3.9 SPS measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p. 6   
59 Anderson, K & Nielsen, C.P., “GMOs, the SPS Agreement and the WTO: The Economics of Quarantine 
and SPS Agreement” p. 312. 
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defined in the SPS Agreement. However, it should be noted that the SPS and TBT 
Agreements are mutually exclusive, in that, they cannot both apply to the same 
measure.60  
In addition, there are other major differences between the SPS & TBT Agreements. The 
TBT Agreement requires that product regulations be applied on an MFN basis, while the 
SPS agreement permits members to impose different sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements on food, animal or plant products sourced from different countries, 
provided that they 'do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries 
where identical or similar conditions prevail'.61 The rationale for this is that differences in 
climate, pests or diseases and food safety conditions are considered. 
The SPS Agreement introduces the precautionary principle which permits member 
countries to adopt SPS measures on a provisional basis in cases where relevant scientific 
evidence is insufficient'.62 This principle takes into account available information' that a 
member country may have or which other members or the relevant international 
organizations may have. Since there is the risk of irreversible damage due to the spread of 
pests and diseases in the case of trade in animals, plants and their products, the SPS 
Agreement incorporates this precautionary principle.63  
However, certain important similarities exist between the SPS and TBT Agreements 
among which being; they both have the same basic rights of non-discrimination and 
similar requirements for the advance of notification of proposed measures and creation of 
information offices known as the enquiry points. To conclude, the SPS Agreement was 
                                                 
60 Course on dispute settlement, 3.9 SPS measures UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.6. 
61 Jha V (2005) “Environmental Regulation and Food Safety: Studies of Protection and Protectionism” 
International Development Research Centre, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd available at 
http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/185-X (Accessed on 16 August 2006). 
62 SPS Agreement, Article 5.7.  
63 Jha V (2005) “Environmental Regulation and Food Safety: Studies of Protection and Protectionism” 
International Development Research Centre, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd available at 
http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/185-X (Accessed on 14 August 2006).  
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largely crafted on the basis of the TBT Agreement64 that no wonder there is little 
difference between the two.  
2.3.2     SPS Agreement and GATT 1994 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) covers all measures relating to 
trade in goods.65 Thus it is a wider Agreement compared to the SPS Agreement. Under 
the SPS Agreement the question does not arise as to whether the measure is 
discriminatory or not, as long as it is scientifically justifiable. By contrast under the 
GATT, Article XX (b), such a measure can only be applied if it were non-discriminatory. 
Much as the SPS Agreement was broadly based on the provisions of Article XX (b), of 
the GATT it did not, however, replace the provisions of the GATT 1947 now replaced by 
GATT 1994, but rather the two Agreements do complement each other.66 
2.3.3     SPS Agreement and Agreement on Agriculture 
 
The SPS Agreement complements the Agreement on Agriculture by way that the latter 
recognises that member states should give effect to the provisions of the SPS 
Agreement.67 In addition, in the event of conflict between the Agreement on Agriculture, 
on the one hand, and the SPS Agreement, on the other, the agreement on agriculture 
prevails.68 Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture states: ‘The provisions of GATT 
1994 and of other multilateral trade agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement 
shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.’69  
 
                                                 
64 Croome, J., “Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements”, The WTO Secretariat, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999, p.62. 
65 Course on Dispute Settlement 3.9 SPS Measures UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, P. 6. 
66UNCTAD, Course on Dispute Settlement 3.9 SPS Measures UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, P. 6. 
67 Article 14 of the Agreement on Agriculture, provides that members agree to give effect to the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.   
68 Pauwelyn, J (2003) Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other 
Rules of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 359.  
69 The multilateral trade agreements contained in Annex 1A to the WTO Treaty (Marrakesh Agreement) are 
those dealing with trade in goods under the WTO. They include; The SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement, 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Agreement on 
Rules of Origin, Agreement on Safeguards among others. 
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2.4      Definition of an SPS measure 
 
Not all measures aimed at public health protection are SPS measures for purposes of the 
SPS Agreement.70 The scope of the SPS Agreement is limited by article 1.1,71 which 
states that the SPS Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which 
may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade. The definitions of the SPS 
Agreement are contained in Annex A of the SPS Agreement, and paragraph 1 of the 
Annex, defines SPS measures to mean; any measure applied to protect animal or plant 
life or health within the territory of the member from risks related to the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests, or diseases, disease carrying organisms or disease 
causing organisms. 
 
According to the SPS Agreement, the sanitary and phytosanitary measures include all 
laws, decrees, regulations, requirements, and procedures related to; end products criteria, 
processes and production procedures, testing, inspection, certification and approval 
procedures, quarantine treatments (associated with animal and plant transport and 
materials required during their transport), statistical methods, sampling procedures, 
methods for risk assessment, packaging and labelling requirements directly related to 
food safety.72 From such definitions it can be concluded that to determine whether a 
measure is an SPS measure it is important to look at the intent of the measure.73 
 
But the definition only covers measures aimed at protecting human and animals from 
food-borne health risks and protecting humans, animals and plants from risks from pests 
or diseases thus measures not directly aimed at health protection, but rather consumer 
information such as labelling requirement for biologically grown vegetables, do not fall 
under the SPS measures.74 This is so because if a measure is not intended to protect 
against one of the mentioned risks in Annex A, then such a measure cannot be a sanitary 
                                                 
70 Course on dispute settlement, 3.9 SPS Measures,(2003) UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, 2003, p.3. 
71 WorldTradeLaw, (2006) Dispute Settlement Commentary, European Communities- Measures Affecting 
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, p.81. 
72 Para 1 A (d) of Annex A of the SPS Agreement.  
73 R, Bhala, (2nd Ed, 2000) International Trade Law, Theory and Practice, Lexis Publishing Limited, 1667. 
74 Course on Dispute Settlement, 3.9 SPS Measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.4. 
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or phytosanitary measure. It could fall under the TBT Agreement or the other 
environmental protection agreements.  
2.5      Application of the SPS Agreement 
 
The SPS Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which directly or 
indirectly affect international trade.75 Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement was fully 
illustrated in the EC-Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) that 
there are two requirements for the SPS Agreement to apply, namely that the measure in 
dispute is an SPS measure and directly or indirectly affect international trade.76 Thus the 
SPS Agreement can only be reliably invoked when the measure is an SPS measure and 
only when it has an effect on international trade. The effect should be a substantial one. 
The SPS Agreement can not for example affect transfer of one or a few pets on a non-
commercial volume of agricultural products. In such situations, countries use other 
agreements.  
 
In addition, in European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products,77 the panel held that in the context of considering the applicability of 
the SPS Agreement, the Panel explained that Annex A(1) indicates that for purposes of 
determining whether a particular measure constitutes an SPS measure regard must be had 
to such elements as the purpose of the measure, its legal form, and its nature. It continued 
that the purpose is contained in Annex A (1)(a) to (d) referring to ‘any measure applied 
to’, the form element is contained in Annex A(1) (relating to laws, decrees and 
regulations), while the nature of the measure is also contained in the same paragraph, that 
is, requirements and procedures include end product criteria, processes and production 
methods.78 Thus for a measure to be considered to be an SPS measure, must fall within 
the definition provided for Annex A, least of which, a measure is not an SPS one. 
 
                                                 
75 SPS Agreement, Article 1.1. 
76 Panel Report, WT/DS26/R/USA, DSR 1998:III, 699N para. 8.38. 
77 WD/DS291.292.293/R. 
78 WD/DS291.292.293/R, para. 7.148-149  
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2.6    Overview of the provisions of the SPS Agreement of particular interest to SSA. 
This section seeks to provide an overview of some of the provision of the SPS Agreement 
of particular relevance to the SSA by explaining the meaning of each article and its 
implications for the developing countries especially the SSA ones. 
2.6.1   Harmonisation of SPS standards 
 
Due to the fact that different WTO member states apply different SPS measures79 due to 
variance in interests of domestic industries, consumers’ tolerance, climatic and 
geographical conditions among other factors,80 the SPS agreement calls for 
internationally set standards to serve as a benchmark for the harmonization of standards 
among WTO members by adopting standards developed by the standard setting bodies.81 
However, this does not prohibit a country from setting standards higher than an 
international norm.82 Tougher standards may be set as long as there is scientific 
justification.83 But this does not require a downward harmonisation to less stringent SPS 
measures.84 The SPS Agreement attempts to balance the aim of increasing free trade 
through harmonising SPS measures and thus reducing barriers to trade caused by 
differing standards, with respect of the right of members to choose their own level of 
protection. 
In EC- Hormones dispute, it was held by the Appellate Body that; 
“In general terms the object and purpose of Article 3 is to promote the harmonisation of 
the SPS measures of members on as wide a basis as possible, while recognising and 
safeguarding, at the same time, the right and duty of members to protect the life and 
health of their people. The ultimate goal of the harmonisation of SPS measures is to 
prevent the use of such measures for arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
members from adopting or enforcing measures which are both necessary a to protect 
                                                 
79 Bhala, R (2nd Ed, 2000) International Trade Law: Theory and Practice, Lexis Publishing Limited, 1669 
80 Course on dispute settlement, 3.9 SPS Measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, 2003, P.16 It is also 
provided in article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. 
81 Jackson, HJ & Sykes, A  (Eds.)  (1997) Implementing the Uruguay Round, Claredon Press, Oxford,10 
82 Art. 3.2 SPS Agreement 
83 SPS Agreement, Article 3.3 
84 Bhala, R (2nd Ed, 2000) International Trade Law: Theory and Practice, Lexis Publishing Limited, 1669  
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human life or health and based on scientific principles and without requiring them to 
change their appropriate level of protection…”.85  
It is important to note that article 3 lays down three methods of harmonisations, those 
being that members may base their SPS measures on international standards, or conform 
their SPS measures to international standards or deviate from the international standards 
under article 3.3 as long as they can scientifically justify such deviation. These three 
alternatives are equally available and there is no rule-exception between them as some 
countries were claiming that the alternative in Art 3.3 is an exception to Art. 3.1 and 
3.2.86  In EC- Hormones,87 it was held that the right of members to establish its own level 
of sanitary protection under Art. 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is not an autonomous right 
and not an exception from a general obligation under Article 3.188 but rather an 
alternative to the others. 
2.6.2    Equivalence 
 
Harmonisation of SPS measures around international standards is desirable, but not 
always possible as local conditions, consumer preferences and technical capacity differ 
between countries. In addition, there are many areas where no international standards 
exist yet.89 Thus the differences in SPS standards between different trading partners can 
negatively affect international trade because the consumers are lacking knowledge of 
which standard applies in which country or region.  
 
Thus the SPS Agreement encourages the use of equivalence and mutual recognition 
agreements in applying SPS measures.90 Article 4 of the SPS Agreement sets out the 
                                                 
85 Appellate Body EC- Hormones, WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 177. 
86 The US in The EC- hormones case had argued that Art 3.1 and 3.2 are the general rule while Article 3.3 
is an exception to them, which the Panel and Appellate Body did not agree with. 
87 Appellate Body, EC – Hormones, WT/DS48/AB/R. 
88 Appellate Body, EC - Hormones, WT/DS48/AB/R para 172. 
89 Course on dispute settlement, 3.9 SPS Measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, 2003, p.43. Also 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add13_en.pdf (Accessed 8 July 2006).  
90 Jensen, M.F., (2002) “Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country Perspective”, The Royal 
Veterinary and Agricultural University, 8 Available at 
http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/policycoherence/index.php/iiis/content/download/373/1454/file/Jensen%20SPS%20A
greement.pdf. (Accessed on 10 August 2006). 
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obligations of members with regard to the recognition of equivalence.91 According to 
article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement, two SPS measures are said to be equivalent to one 
another when they are not identical but yield the same level of sanitary and phytosanitary 
protection.   
 
However, difficulty arises where the developed countries are maintaining a relatively 
higher level of SPS standards than their developing counterparts, and then they are 
required to accord equivalence status to the low standards. To developed countries, 
equivalence operates to lower SPS standards because it is designed to facilitate trade not 
to raise consumer protection standards.92 Yet on the other hand, the DCs are concerned 
about developed countries implementation of equivalence, where they demand for 
‘sameness’ rather than ‘equivalence’ to certify the compliance of SPS standards in the 
different countries.93  
 
On the contrary, I suggest that since developing countries have differing capabilities in 
the implementation of SPS measures, equivalence of SPS measures could go a long way 
towards improving market access for their food and agricultural products. This is because 
even the agricultural products from the developing countries where there are low levels 
of SPS standards, can gain access to the developed countries’ markets due to equivalence 
of their SPS measures. 
 
Article 4.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that member states upon request can enter into 
consultations with the aim of achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements on 
recognition of the equivalence of specified sanitary or phytosanitary measures. This 
allows countries with divergent SPS measures to enter into negotiations aimed towards 
                                                 
91 Article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that member states shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures of other members as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or from those used 
by other members trading in the same product, if the exporting member objectively demonstrates to the 
importing member that its measures achieve the importing member's appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection.  
92 Silverglade, BA (2000) “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Weakening 
Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade?” The Food and Drug Law Journal, 517, 522. 
93 Course on dispute settlement, 3.9 SPS Measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, 2003, p.44. Also 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add13_en.pdf (Accessed on 14 July 2006).  
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recognising each other’s measures. This may be on a bilateral or multilateral level. Again, 
the developing countries, more especially those in the SSA region lack the ability to 
negotiate in order to reach meaningful equivalence levels. This can be attributed to their 
lack of technical capacity to do so.   
2.6.3    Adaptation to regional conditions 
 
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement encourages members to adapt their SPS measures to the 
regional characteristics of their trading partners.94 Prior to the SPS Agreement, it had 
been common to impose a ban on exports of a country if a particular problem exists in 
that country, even in case where the problem is isolated to specific regions in the 
country.95 In addition prevalence of pests and diseases is not determined by national 
boundaries, and may differ between various regions within a country due to variation of 
climatic, environmental and or geographical conditions. What article 6 does is to make 
countries recognise pest-or disease free areas of other countries where a particular region 
might be infected by a disease or pests by use of objective factors96 such as geography, 
ecosystems, and effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls.97 
 
By having an importing country adapt their SPS measures to the conditions prevailing in 
a region of origin of the product, may greatly improve market access possibilities.98 Thus 
the opportunities for DCs especially the larger countries to access agricultural markets 
could be improved, as the cost of eradicating pests or diseases or keeping a region pest 
free can be limited by focusing on specific areas.  
                                                 
94 In part, article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that Members shall ensure that their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures are adapted to the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the area — whether 
all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of several countries — from which the product originated 
and to which the product is destined.  
95 Jensen, M.F., (2002) “Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country Perspective”, The Royal 
Veterinary and Agricultural University, p.9 Available at 
http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/policycoherence/index.php/iiis/content/download/373/1454/file/Jensen%20SPS%20A
greement.pdf. 
96 Ibid. 
97 SPS Agreement, Article 6.2. 
98 Course on dispute settlement, 3.9 SPS Measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, 2003, p.45 Also 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add13_en.pdf (Accessed on 14 July 2006) 
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2.6.4    Transparency 
 
The SPS Agreement emphasises the importance of transparency in the development and 
application of SPS measures.99 Countries are supposed to notify any changes in their SPS 
measures.100 The procedure is provided for under Annex B of the SPS Agreement. 
However, lack of transparency has remained an obstacle to international trade.101 This is 
so because SPS measures are complex and subject to change. Thus transparency and 
notification is key to export markets in international trade as regards SPS measures. 
 
Under transparency and notification, countries are not only required to promptly publish 
new SPS measures102 but also set up enquiry points103 to provide further information 
when needed. However where there is no measure and no international standard, 
guideline or recommendation, then a country seeking to establish such a measure has to 
publish a notice so as to acquaint other WTO countries with the proposal to introduce a 
measure,104 then allow other members through the WTO secretariat105and lastly allow 
reasonable time (which is in most cases is 6 months)106 to make comments in writing.107 
 
However in cases of an emergency or urgency, a country may introduce new or revise 
existing measures without delay by dispensing with the above said procedure, but in 
order to do so a member must immediately notify other Members, through the WTO 
Secretariat. But again, the SSA countries lack the ability to make any response to the 
notifications. As such, they end up with standards they cannot meet.  
                                                 
99  SPS Agreement, Article 7.1. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Course on Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.43. 
102 Para. 1 Annex B, SPS Agreement. 
103 Para. 3 Annex B, SPS Agreement. 
104 Para. 5(a) Annex B, SPS Agreement. 
105 Para, 5(b) Annex B, SPS Agreement. 
106 Decision on Implementation adopted at the Doha Ministerial Conference sets the reasonable adaptation 
period at normally a period of not less than 6 months (WT/MIN (01)/17, dated 14th November 2001. 
107 Para, 5(d) Annex B, SPS Agreement. 
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2.6.5    Technical Assistance  
 
The SPS Agreement in principle applies equally to both the developed as well as 
developing countries (DCs).108 However the SPS agreement recognises that member 
countries have to facilitate the provisions of technical assistance, especially to DCs either 
bilaterally or through the appropriate international organisations.109 The required 
technical assistance not only relates to improving DCs understanding of the rules 
applicable under the SPS Agreement, but crucially the acquisition of technical and 
scientific capacity to meet their obligations and enforce their rights under the SPS 
Agreement.110 This is done by the establishment of infrastructures such as laboratories, 
veterinary services, and equipments, among other things. During the Doha Decision on 
implementation, members were urged to provide financial assistance to LDCs to enable 
them to respond to SPS measures, which may negatively affect their trade.111 But the SPS 
Agreement provides that longer time frames for compliance should be accorded on 
products of interest to DCs so as to maintain their exports. 
 
In 2002, the World Bank and WTO established a fund to provide funding for developing 
countries to assist them to meet SPS standards. The World Bank pledged US$ 300,000 
and the WTO pledged to contribute from the Doha Development Trust Fund.112 However, 
no substantial use of these funds to the SSA countries has been made. 
2.6.6     Special and Differential Treatment 
 
In preparation and application of SPS measures, members have to take into account of the 
special needs of DCs, in particular the Least Developed Countries,113 to which a majority 
of SSA countries fall. The special and differential treatment under the SPS Agreement is 
                                                 
108 Course on Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.51. 
109 SPS Agreement, Article 9.1. 
110 Course on Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, P.51. 
111 WT/MIN (01)/17, dated 14 November, 2001. 
112 WTO Press Release (2002) “The World Bank Grant kicks off Bank- WTO assistance on standards” 
p.314 dated 27 September 2002 
113 SPS Agreement, Article, 10.1. 
 
 
 
 
 26
aimed at ensuring that the special constraints faced by DCs are recognised whenever an 
SPS measure is introduced.114 But the SPS Agreement provides that longer time frames 
for compliance should be accorded on products of interest to DCs so as to maintain their 
exports.115 Unfortunately as it shall be discussed in chapter four, the special and 
differential provisions are not mandatory, a factor has led the developed countries to defy 
applying them without impunity.  
 
In setting the SPS measures, the WTO uses the international standards setting 
organisations, which are discussed below. 
2.6.7     International Standard Setting Organisations 
 
 The WTO tackles the SPS Agreement’s potential to cause distractions in international 
trade by harmonising the standard setting through establishment of standards setting 
organisations, like the; Codex Alimentarius Commission, Office of International 
Epizootics and the organisations set up under the International Plant Protection 
Convention. The WTO gives greater importance to the said international bodies.116 Thus 
a discussion of the application of the SPS Agreement cannot be concluded without 
referring to these important standard setting organisations. 
 
• The Joint FAO/WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) was formed in 1961,117 as a partnership 
between the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO). The Codex Alimentarius, which is a collection of international food 
standards adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, includes standards for all the 
principal foods: processed, semi-processed or raw.118 To date, the Codex Alimentarius 
                                                 
114 UNCTAD UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.53. 
115 SPS Agreement, Article 10.2. 
116 Bureau, JC & Doussin, JP (1999) “Sanitary and Technical Regulations: Issues for the Trade 
Liberalisation in the Diary Sector”, Working Paper INRA-ESR Grignon p.2. 
117 Understanding the Codex Alimentarius Commission, FAO Corporate Document Repository, 1999, M-
83 ISBN 92-5-104248-9, p. 2 available at  
118 Ibid 
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Commission includes 4,821 standards.119 The main purpose of the standards is to protect 
the health of consumers and to ensure fair practices in the food trade.120 The CAC creates 
a uniform set of standards to assist in the harmonization of domestic regulation in order 
to facilitate international trade. Standards are specified in the areas of Food Standards for 
Commodities, Codes of Hygienic or Technological Practice, Limits for Pesticide 
Residues, Guidelines for Contaminants and Food Additives Evaluated, and Veterinary 
Drugs Evaluated among others.121 With the SPS Agreement, the function of the Codex in 
the international order changed dramatically. In the past, although the goal of the Codex 
ostensibly had been to encourage the unification of state food policies, the harmonization 
mechanism most effectively used by the Codex was informal policy convergence, 
utilizing the "soft" tools of persuasion and the spread of scientific information. Now, 
Codex standards are backed by a system of significant legal and economic incentives 
promoting the unification of regulatory food policy.122 
However, the main issues that arise are that the SSA countries are some times unable to 
meet the harmonised standards, and they are poorly represented in the Codex. This in turn 
affects their exports to the international market because they are not party to the standards 
set.  
• The Office of International Epizootics (OIE) 
The OIE was formed in 1924.123 Its objectives and functions include the harmonization of 
health requirements for international trade in animals and animal products and the 
adoption of international standards in the field of animal health.124  
In the absence of more precise indications, standards developed by a limited number of 
                                                 
119 Zarrilli, S (1990) “Main Issues for Developing Countries in the SPS Agreement,” Available at, 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/snp/snp-05.htm (Accessed 10 August 2006) 
120 Livermore, MA (2006) “Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional 
Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius.” New York University Law Review, 767   
121 Ibid 
122 Livermore, MA Livermore, MA (2006) “Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, 
Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius.” New York University Law Review, 767, 777.   
123 Zarrilli, (1999) “The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: 
Issues for Developing Countries.”  Trade Related Agenda, Development & Equity, (T.R.A.D.E), South 
Centre, p.1 Available at http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/sps/resources/international/dc-issues.pdf (Accessed 
on 10 June 2006). 
124 Ibid. 
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countries or approved by a narrow majority of participants may get the status of 
international standards. Developing countries have repeatedly expressed their concern 
about the way in which international standards are developed and approved, pointing out 
how their own participation is very limited from the point of view of both numbers and 
effectiveness irrespective of the preamble of the SPS Agreement that they should be 
encouraged to take part in the standard setting organisations.125 
• The International Plant Protection Convention.  
The Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) was formed in 
1993.126 The IPPC has 153 members to date the latest to join being Myanmar.127 The 
IPPC is responsible for phytosanitary (Plant Protection) standard setting and the 
harmonization of phytosanitary measures affecting trade.128 To date, a number of 
standards have been completed and 14 others are at different stages of development.129 
Just like the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the IPPC uses harmonisation as the tool 
for streamlining the phytosanitary measures in as far as the protection of plant life and or 
health is concerned. But again the participation of the developing countries especially the 
SSA countries is still minimal. 
2.6.8     An appraisal of the three sister organisations 
 
The standards, guidelines and recommendations of these three international 
organisations, referred to as the “three sisters”, are the benchmark for meeting the 
requirements of the SPS Agreement. It should be pointed out as earlier was, that the SPS 
                                                 
125 Article 10.4 of the SPS Agreement also provides that Members should encourage and facilitate the 
active participation of developing country Members in the relevant international organizations. 
126 Zarrilli, S (1999) “The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: 
Issues for Developing Countries.”  Trade Related Agenda, Development & Equity, (T.R.A.D.E), South 
Centre, p.1 Available at http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/sps/resources/international/dc-issues.pdf (Accessed 
on 10 June 2006. 
127 Available at, http://www.fao.org/Legal/TREATIES/004s-e.htm (Accessed on the 12th August 2006.) 
Myanmar joined on the 26th June 2006.  
128 International Plant Protection Convention, http://www.oie.int/eng/OIE/en_histoire.htm (Accessed on 12 
August 2006). 
129 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
 29
agreement itself does not set standards or establish any particular measure, but rather 
provides guidelines that have to be followed in the establishment of measures. 
 
Thus the above standard setting organisations have been influential in the international 
harmonisation of the SPS measures. This is because measures that conform to 
international standards are presumed to be in conformity with the requirements of the 
SPS Agreement and GATT 1994. Thus the standards set reduce the compliance costs by 
reducing the number of standards with which developing countries would have to 
comply.130  
However, these organisations are dominated by developed countries131 and they choose 
which areas to set up SPS standards and also there are no established standards in areas 
where they do not have interest. It should also be recalled that the organisations were 
established some time before the WTO132 and therefore most countries have taken up 
SPS measures that were in existence before, which are applicable to them. But sometimes 
those measures are stringent.  
2.7    Conclusion 
 
From the start of the negotiation of the SPS agreement, it has been clearly shown as to 
where each country falls with regard to the implementation of SPS measures. As for the 
EC and the US, were agitating for stricter measures, yet on the other hand, most DCs 
advocated and still do for the removal or downward harmonisation of the SPS measures. 
 
The SPS Agreement sets up provisions which are aimed at the promotion of international 
trade specifically for DCs and SSA as a region. These range from harmonisation of SPS 
                                                 
130 Mayeda, G (2004)7 “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries”, Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University 
Press, p.751. 
131 Ibid p.752.  
132 The Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) was established in 1961, the Office of the International 
Epizootics (OIE) in 1924, and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in 1993. Yet the WTO 
and thus the SPS Agreement was only formed in 1995. Again these organisations were primarily set up to 
promote health standards and not trade, thus, some of the measures recognised as international standards 
are a little bit to stringent.   
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measures, recognition of equivalence agreements, adaptation to regional conditions, 
technical assistance, recognition of special and differential treatment of DCs, dispute 
resolution which puts into consideration the DCs, transparency and notification 
provisions 
  
Lastly, it can be noted that the SPS Agreement aims at balancing the apparent conflict 
between a country’s right to protect its human, animal and plant life and health but at the 
same time not to use such measures as a disguised barrier to international trade. This is 
done through the strong emphasis being put on the harmonisation of the sanitary 
standards by adhering to the standards set by the international standard setting bodies. For 
most SSA countries, however, meeting such standards has proved to be costly and at the 
same time, they are set too high thus denying them access to developed countries’ 
markets. The result is that restriction to international trade both by accident and design 
because of the high standards imposed by the developed countries.  
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________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 3  
 
THE SPS AGREEMENT AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE WTO 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is focusing on the various Panel and Appellate Body decisions pertaining to 
the interpretation of the SPS Agreement. This discussion shall not delve too much into 
the entire SPS Agreement as this has already been covered in chapter 2, but rather on 
interpretations of some of the articles which have been found to be contentious. Then an 
implication for SSA countries of the rulings shall be critically discussed. There have been 
a number WTO cases brought under the SPS Agreement, but notable among which to be 
referred to include but not limited to; The EC—Hormones133, Australia—Salmon134, and 
Japan—Agricultural products II,135 covering the three parts of the SPS Agreement; 
human, animal and plant life or health respectively. 
 
The parties to the trade disputes have invoked only Articles 2,3,5,7, and 8 of the SPS 
Agreement. Thus, a significant number of deliberations have been made on these articles 
both by the Panel and Appellate Body. It follows that this discussion is to be based on the 
Panel and Appellate Body’ s interpretation of articles 2,3, & 5 of the SPS Agreement. 
Table 1, below shows the different cases and articles that have been invoked so far under 
the SPS Agreement:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
133 EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (EC-Hormones) WT/DS48/ABR, DSR 
1998:1 
134 Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon(Australia-Salmon), WT/DS18/AB/R (1998) 
135 Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan-Agricultural Products II, WT/DS76AB/R, 
adopted on 19 March 1999.  
 
 
 
 
 32
Table1: SPS/WTO trade disputes 
 Case Name  Case Number Invoked Articles 
1 Australia—Salmon WT/DS18 Articles 2,3 and 5 
2 EC- Hormones (US) WT/DS26 Articles 2,3, and 5 
3 EC-Hormones (Canada) WT/DS48 Articles 2,3, and 5 
4 Japan – Agricultural Products II WT/DS76 Articles 2,5,7 and 8
Source: WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice. Vol. 1, 1st Ed, (2003) p.525  
 
Apart from the trade disputes mentioned above, reference is going to be made to the latest 
EC-Biotech trade dispute.136 However, from the onset, it should be noted that it is just a 
panel decision which may be overturned by the Appellate Body on appeal. But it raises a 
number of principles that are of significance to the SSA countries.  
3.1.1 The Dispute Settlement system 
 
The objective of this chapter is the concentration on the interpretation of the various SPS 
Agreement articles, it is important to cover the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), so as to facilitate an 
understanding how the entire dispute settlement procedure under the WTO functions  
3.1.2 Dispute Settlement Procedures of particular relevance to the SPS 
Disputes. 
 
When a country has allegedly violated the SPS Agreement in its application of an SPS 
measure, a complaining country can request the DSB for consultations with that country. 
Within 10 days, a member to which a request for consultations is made has to reply to the 
request or within 30 days enter into consultations with the other party.137 If consultations 
fail to settle the matter within 60 days from the date of receipt of the request for 
                                                 
136 The EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291.292.293/R. 
The Panel Report was adopted in September 2006. 
137 The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) Article 4.3.  
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consultations, then the complaining party may request the establishment of a Panel.138 
But before a Panel is constituted, at the request of either party to the dispute, there is 
always the good office of the Director General of the WTO for Conciliation and 
Arbitration.139 Notwithstanding the good offices provisions, when the 60 days have 
elapsed, if a complaining party so requests, then a Panel shall be constituted.140  
 
A request for a panel has to identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief 
summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.141 A 
Panel can only address those measures and legal claims sufficiently specified in the 
complaining party’s request.142 The Appellate Body in Australia- Salmon held that the 
SPS measure at issue could only be the measure that is actually applied to the product at 
issue.143 In that case, the complainant, Canada, had only referred the product at issue to 
be ‘fresh, chilled and frozen salmon’ thus only being an import ban on those items rather 
than being a SPS infringement relating to smoked fish. Thus it is important to define 
broadly the product scope of SPS claims and not to limit them only to the specific kind of 
product denied market access144. In that case, it would have been better to refer to Salmon 
generally rather than the particular salmon.   
3.1.3 Burden of proof 
 
The issue of which party bears the ‘burden of proof’ has been very prominent in SPS 
disputes.145 But the Appellate Body has since resolved this issue. In the EC-Hormones, it 
was held that the initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a 
prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of the SPS Agreement by the 
                                                 
138 DSU, Article 4.7.  
139 DSU, Article 5.3. 
140 DSU, Article 6.1.  
141 DSU, Article 6.2. 
142 Pauwelyn, J (1999) “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in 
the First Three SPS Disputes, Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, 657. 
143 Appellate Body Report on Australia- Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (1998) para. 101. 
144 Pauwelyn, J “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in the 
First Three SPS Disputes, Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, footnote 
94, p. 657-658. 
145 Ibid, p. 659. 
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Respondent. If a prima facie case is established or made, the respondent has the burden to 
counter or refute the inconsistency.146 
 
Further in United States- Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool shirts and Blouses 
from India,147 the Appellate Body held that: 
 
“The party who asserts a fact, whether the Claimant or the Respondent, is 
responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally- accepted canon of 
evidence in civil law, common law and in fact, in most jurisdictions, that the 
burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who 
asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.”148 
 
So, it would be correct for one to suggest that the burden of proof is not always constant 
on the defending party (Respondent) but rather on a party which alleges an affirmative. 
3.1.5 Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body rulings 
 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is responsible for surveillance of implementation of 
Panel and Appellate Body rulings.149 The adoption of reports is automatic unless a 
consensus against them is found.150 If a Panel finds that an (SPS) Agreement has been 
violated, it recommends that the member concerned immediately brings the offending 
measure into conformity with its WTO obligations.151 If it is impractical to do so, then it 
is granted a reasonable period of time for implementation.152 The reasonable period 
normally does not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a Panel or Appellate 
Body Report.153 
                                                 
146 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, WT/DS48/ABR para. 98.  
147 WT/DS33/AB/R. 
148 WT/DS33/AB/R, para. 14. 
149 Davey, WJ (2005) “The WTO dispute settlement system: How have developing countries Fared?” P. 7 
150 Pauwelyn, J (1999) “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in 
the First Three SPS Disputes, Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, 662. 
151 DSU, Article 21.3. 
152 Pauwelyn, J (1999) “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in 
the First Three SPS Disputes, Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, 662. 
153 Davey, WJ (2005) “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: How Have Developed Countries Fared?” 
SSRN Draft, p. 7. 
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If a party fails to implement the request within a reasonable period, the prevailing party 
may request for compensation, though, compensation is only temporary. But if 
compensation is not forthcoming, then it may request the DSB to authorise it to suspend 
concessions (taking retaliatory action) against a non-complying country. 
 
Analysing the available remedies, however, reveals that they are impracticably applied to 
the context of the SSA countries because of a number of reasons but notable among them 
is that they lack the ability to put up meaningful retaliation. However, suspension of 
concessions only comes as a last resort after failure of compensation. 
3.2     Right to take SPS Measures 
  
Art. 2.1 of the SPS Agreement recognises the right of sovereign governments to take SPS 
measures for the protection of human, animal and plant life or health, with the need to 
promote free trade and prevent protectionism.154 This provision represents a movement 
away from the position under GATT, where in principle discriminatory health measures 
are prohibited unless they can be justified under the exception in article XX (b), thus the 
burden of proof rests on the imposing country that its measure is justifiable.155 While the 
SPS agreement provides that the SPS measures in principle are allowed subject to the 
condition that such measure comply with the disciplines of the Agreement. Art 2.2 
provides that; 
 
“Members shall ensure that any sanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is 
not maintained without sufficient evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of 
Article 5.”156 [Emphasis added] 
 
Thus the article lays down two basic requirements for SPS measures, namely that they 
should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, and also they must have a basis in scientific evidence save as provided for in 
                                                 
154 Course on dispute settlement, 3.9 SPS Measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, 2003, P.11 
155 Ibid  
156 SPS Agreement, Article 2.2.  
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Article 5.7 This article introduces science as a cornerstone upon which SPS measures 
should be based.  
 
However, the determination of what is necessary causes some difficulties because it is not 
clearly defined. Though applying the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the word 
necessary in relation to article XX of GATT, it is reasonable to assume that the decision 
would be applicable to the definition of the word necessary in article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement. In Korea— Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef 
(“Korea—Beef”),157 the Appellate Body stated:  
 
“As used in Article XX (d), the term “necessary” refers, in our view, to a range of 
degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies “necessary” understood as 
“indispensable”; at the other end, is “necessary” measure is, in this continuum, located 
significantly closer to the pole of “indispensable” than to the opposite pole of simply 
“making a contribution to.”158 
 
Thus in order to demonstrate that a measure is “necessary” to protect human, animal and 
plant life or health therefore, a defending party would have to show that the measure is 
close to indispensable to a country’s policy of protection of life and health. This should 
be the test to be applied whenever a country tries to put up sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures. 
3.2.1    Measures to be based on scientific evidence 
 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that the SPS measures should be based on 
scientific principles and not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence save for 
as provided in Article 5.7 (dealing with situations where there is insufficient scientific 
evidence). This provision is the first to mention the scientific disciplines in the SPS 
                                                 
157 Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted on 10 January 2001  
158 Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted on 10 January 2001, 
para.161.  
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Agreement and establishes science as a cornerstone against which SPS Measures are to 
be based.159 
3.2.2     Sufficient Scientific Evidence  
 
The second part of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement is with regard to the fact that a 
measure is based on sufficient scientific evidence. The question would, however, be that 
what amounts to sufficient scientific evidence. In Japan – Agricultural Products, the 
Appellate Body held that sufficiency is a relational concept, requiring the existence of an 
adequate relationship between two elements, in this case the SPS measure and the 
scientific evidence which is to be determined on a case-by-case basis and depending upon 
the particular circumstances of the case.160  
 
As such, it suffices to suggest that the Panel has a ‘qualified’ discretion in determining 
whether an objective or rational relationship exists between the SPS measures and 
scientific evidence.161 This is so because the panel looks at factors such as quantity and 
quality of the scientific evidence and the various characteristics of the SPS measure. 
However, where there is a reputable scientific evidence or support for a measure, there is 
no need to prove sufficiency of scientific evidence, because the relationship between the 
SPS measure and scientific evidence is established.162  
 
One would however, question whether this relationship should have a pivotal role in 
determining whether there is sufficient scientific evidence or not. This is in relation to the 
fact that countries sometimes determine sufficiency of scientific evidence abruptly 
because of an emerging risky disease like the Avian Influenza or the Mad Cow Disease. 
It suffices to suggest that in such a situation the relationship would be easy to establish 
because of the fact that the risk poses more danger and would be out of hand if not 
controlled as soon as possible, thus it would be more reasonable for such countries to 
prevent dangerous outbreaks by way of taking ‘safeguard’ measures. Such provisional 
                                                 
159 Ibid, p.12. 
160 Appellate Body Report, Japan- Agricultural Products II WT/DS245/AB/R, Para.73. 
161 UNCTAD Course on dispute settlement 3.9 SPS measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.13. 
162 Ibid. 
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measures are, however, provided for under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement (which shall 
be discussed later). 
3.2.3   No arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on 
trade 
 
Article 2.3 SPS Agreement provides that in applying SPS measures, countries should not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against or between countries where similar or 
same effects appear, or prevail including their own territory and that of other countries, 
and SPS measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade. 
 
The Compliance Panel in the Australia- Salmon,163 identified 3 elements, which have to 
be cumulative in nature, for a measure to qualify under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. 
Those being:  
• The measure discriminates between the territories of members other than the 
member imposing the measure or between the territory of the member imposing 
the measure and that of another. 
• The discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable, and 
• Identical or similar conditions prevail in the territory of the member compared.164 
 
This principle in effect reflects the provisions of the Article I of the GATT (The MFN 
principle) and Article III (on National Treatment) as well the chapeau of Article XX of 
the GATT. The kind of discrimination envisaged in Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, 
however, aims not only at like products but across different products as well. This is 
because different products may pose the same or similar health risks and should therefore 
be treated in the same way.165 For example, different animals may pose the same risk of 
avian influenza 
 
                                                 
163 WTO Secretariat, (1st Ed, 2003) WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law & Practice, Cambridge 
University Press. P.482  
164 Compliance Panel Report, Australia- Salmon, para. 7.111 
165 UNCTAD Course on dispute settlement 3.9 SPS measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.15 
 
 
 
 
 39
Thus discrimination would only be justifiable to be along all products which are 
associated with the risk, as long as the discrimination is backed up with sufficient 
scientific evidence, rather than a single product because risk may be posed by one or 
another similar product. But still, the said discrimination does not have to be 
unjustifiable, as this would be construed to mean that it is a disguised restriction on 
international trade. 
 
That being said, it suffices, to note that the provisions of Article 2.3 can only apply if the 
three above listed grounds are all in play because they are cumulative in nature. For 
example, even if there is discrimination but if such discrimination is not justifiable, or the 
conditions differ, then Article 2.3 cannot apply. This provision is further reiterated in the 
provisions of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement which should be read in context. Article 
shall be discussed later. 
3.3     Harmonisation of SPS measures 
 
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that members are to harmonize sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, based on established international 
standards. In EC-Hormones, the US argued that ‘based on’ should be interpreted as 
‘conform to’. Thus it would imply that countries are obliged to use measures resulting in 
the same level of protection as the international standards.166 
 
The Appellate Body was of a different view that countries are allowed to use SPS 
measures that result in levels of protection that differ from those achieved by 
international standards while still respecting the harmonisation requirement of the SPS 
Agreement.  According to Jensen (2002), the interpretation implies that the standards 
issued by international organisations are not binding norms for SPS measures.167 This 
interpretation has been held to be the correct one by the Appellate Body, in the preceding 
cases of Australia-Salmon and Japan-Agricultural Products II.  
 
                                                 
166 Jensen, MF  (2002)“Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country Perspective”, p.14 
167 Ibid.  p.15. 
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However on a closer reading of Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, it can be said that a 
member country can be made to ratchet up its SPS measure if it is below the recognised 
international standard168 to the minimum acceptable measures. Thus I suggest that the 
standards setting organisations should not only be looked at as the only source of 
scientific proof. Otherwise, this would render the principle of risk assessment and taking 
a provisional measure (in case there is no insufficient scientific evidence) on the other 
hand redundant yet there are always other established scientific schools of thought which 
countries can and do use to reach their desired health standards.  
3.4     Risk Assessment 
 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that Members should ensure that their SPS 
Measures are based on an assessment of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, 
taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations such as the CAC, OIE and the organisations established under the auspices 
of IPPC. On the other hand, risk assessment has been defined in the SPS Agreement. 
 
Annex A.4 of the SPS Agreement defines two types of risk assessment techniques, which 
correspond to the two broad goals of the SPS measures as defined in Annex A.1, namely, 
protection from risks from pests or diseases, and protection from food-borne risks. 
3.4.1     Risk assessment for protection from risks of pests or diseases 
 
Risk assessment in relation to protection from risks of pests or diseases requires the 
evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within 
the territory of an importing country according to the SPS measure which might be 
applied and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences.169 In EC- 
                                                 
168 Pauwelyn, J., “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation: Is the WTO ‘Missing the Boat’? p.15 A 
paper presented at a conference on Legal Patterns of Transnational Social Regulations & Trade” The 
European University Institute, Florence Italy 24-25th September 2004.  Also available at    
http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00001311/01/6Sept04.pdf (Accessed on the 27th off September 2006). 
However, by interpreting Article 3.1 to allow a country to have its low SPS measures made tighter would 
be encouraging stricter SPS measures which would be against one of the main aims of the WTO is to allow 
free trade as much as possible by reduction of all forms of trade restrictions.  
169 UNCTAD Course on dispute settlement 3.9 SPS measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.24. 
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Hormones, the Panel was of the view that a risk assessment carried out in accordance 
with the SPS Agreement should:  
 
a) Identify the adverse effects on human health arising from the presence of the 
hormones at issue when used as growth promoters in meat or meat products, and 
b) If any such adverse effects exist, evaluate the potential or probability of 
occurrence of these effects170 
 
However the Appellate Body cautioned about the use of the words potential and 
probability inter-changeably. It stated: 
 
“…the Panel’s use of probability as an alternative term for potential creates a significant 
concern. The ordinary meaning of potential relates to possibility and is different from the 
ordinary meaning of possibility. Probability implies a higher degree or a threshold of 
potentiality or possibility. It thus appears that here the Panel introduces a quantitative 
dimension to the notion of risk”171 
 
The Appellate Body’s conclusion is spot on as the risk cannot, and should not only be 
quantitative in nature, but rather more qualitative. This is so because the risk which is 
being considered should not be looked at in terms of how much it is going to affect, but 
rather how it is going to affect a country’ s human, animal and plant life or health. 
3.4.2     Risk assessment in relation to food borne risks 
 
Risk assessment for food borne risks requires that the evaluation of the potential for 
adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.172 
In Australia-Salmon, the SPS measure at issue was aimed at preventing the entry, 
establishment or spread of fish diseases. Thus the second definition of risk assessment 
was applicable. The Panel held that, this type of risk assessment must:  
 
                                                 
170 Panel Report, EC-Hormones (US), WT/DS48/ABR, para. 8.98. 
171 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, WT/DS48/ABR para. 184. 
172 Course on Dispute Settlement, 3.9 SPS measures UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13 p.24. 
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a) Assess the risk of entry, establishment or spread of a disease, and 
b) Assess the risk of the associated potential biological and economic 
consequences.173 
 
In order to assess the above two elements of risk under the first definition, a three 
prolonged test must be met174 as found by the Appellate Body in Australia- Salmon175 to 
be:  
• Identify the pests or diseases whose entry, establishment or spread a member 
wants to prevent within its territory as well as the potential biological and 
economic consequences as associated with the entry, establishment or spread of 
these diseases. 
• Evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these pests or 
diseases, as well as the associated potential biological and economic 
consequences, and  
• Evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases 
according to the SPS measures which might be applied.  
 
However the second definition differs from the first as the former does not involve an 
evaluation of biological and economic consequences,176 thus arguably being easier to 
conduct.177 The reason is that in cases where human health is at risk, there is no need to 
consider economic factors.178 
 
In addition, there is a difference in the use of the language in the definitions; the first 
definition requires the “likelihood” or probability of entry while the second calls for the 
evaluation of the potential. In Japan- Agricultural Products II, the Appellate Body 
                                                 
173 WT/DS18/R corr.1 para. 8.72.   
174 Course on Dispute Settlement, 3.9 SPS measures UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.25. 
175 Appellate Body Report, WT/DS18/AB/R para. 121. 
176 Course on Dispute Settlement, 3.9 SPS measures UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.25 
177 Pauwelyn, J (1999) “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in 
the First Three SPS Disputes, Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University Press,p.648. 
178 UNCTAD Course on dispute settlement 3.9 SPS measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.25.  
 
 
 
 
 43
equated likelihood to probability which is not sufficient just to show the possibility of 
entry, establishment or spread of diseases.179  
 
It suffices to point out that this is due to the fact that in cases involving human life or 
health, it would only be sensible not to consider other factors like economic, but has to be 
based on the genuine reason of protection of life and health. Thus to the SSA countries, 
such a risk assessment is easy to conduct. Yet on the other hand, risk assessment 
involving animals and plants is quite expensive and difficult to carryout as it involves a 
number of issues to be considered.  
3.4.3      Relevant factors in assessing risk. 
 
Apart from requiring countries from taking into considerations techniques developed by 
international organisations,180 the SPS Agreement does not specify a methodology to be 
used in conducting a risk assessment. Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, however, sums up 
specific factors to be taken into account in risk assessment. Article 5.2 provides the 
necessary factors, namely; available scientific evidence, relevant processes and 
production methods, relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods, prevalence of 
specific diseases or pests, existence of pest-or-disease free areas, relevant ecological and 
environmental conditions and quarantine or other treatment. 
 
However one would question whether the above listed factors eliminate other factors 
other than the scientific ones, like consumer concerns. In EC- Hormones, the Appellate 
Body was of the view that:   
 
“There is nothing to indicate that the listing of factors that may be taken into account in a 
risk assessment of Article 5.2 was intended to be a closed list. It is essential to bear in 
mind that the risk is to be evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk 
ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but 
                                                 
179 Appellate Body Report, Japan Agricultural Products II, WT/DS76AB/R, para. 113-114. 
180 UNCTAD Course on dispute settlement 3.9 SPS measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.27. 
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also risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for 
adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die”181 
 
This decision by the Appellate Body is quite good considered from the SSA countries 
perspective. The SSA countries lack adequate technical advancement and expertise in 
order to carryout risk assessment. Thus holding that risk assessment should also be done 
basing on the actual potential effect on people, in a way simplifies the whole risk 
assessment process which is of benefit to the SSA. 
3.4.4      Common Scientific finding 
 
In cases where different experts exist, and they have differing positions, which view 
would the Panel take as the right one in determining whether the risk assessment was 
based on sufficient scientific evidence? This issue has now been resolved. The risk 
assessment does not have to come to a monolithic conclusion that coincides with the 
scientific conclusion. In EC-Hormones,182 the Appellate Body held that Article 5.1 of the 
SPS Agreement requires that the risk assessment must necessarily embody only the view 
of a majority of the relevant scientific community. Governments can and should be able 
to base their risk assessments on other recognised sources.  
3.5      Determination of the Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP) 
 
Paragraph 5 of Annex A defines the concept of appropriate level of protection, as the 
level of protection deemed appropriate by the member imposing the measure. In 
Australia- Salmon, the Appellate Body stated that the determination of the appropriate 
level of protection is a prerogative of the member concerned and not of a panel or the 
Appellate Body.183 But it may be asked as to what extent should this “prerogative” be 
taken, and what are the determinant factors for this?  
 
                                                 
181 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, WT/DS48/ABR para. 187.  
182 Appellate Body Report, WT/DS48/ABR, para.194. 
183 Appellate Body Report, Australia-Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 125. 
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This discretion has to be based on scientific information as well as other considerations 
such as the producer and consumer preferences.184 In such a situation, a country can look 
at other social judgments before establishing a measure, like the social acceptability of 
certain types of risk, consumer tolerance and risk perception. But this only applies to 
measures where there is protection of animal and plant life or health. To put it differently, 
when determining an SPS measure for the protection of human life, there is no need to 
refer to other considerations as long as a measure is scientifically proved. 
 
However looking at the ALOP from such a perspective, it may seem as if countries have 
a right to set up appropriate levels of sanitary and phytosanitary protections, which they 
in their own discretion deem fit. But a member could exercise this unjustifiably and as 
such end up being an impediment on international trade. 
3.6       Consistency in application of SPS measures  
 
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, contains a binding obligation relating to ALOP.185 In 
part, Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement provides that the objective of achieving 
consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life 
or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it 
considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. 
 
There are basically two principles provided for in article 5.5, namely: 
a) The goal of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of ALOP of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection; and 
b) The legal obligations to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of 
protection considered to be appropriate in different situations, if these distinctions 
result in discrimination or disguised trade restrictions186 
                                                 
184 UNCTAD Course on dispute settlement 3.9 SPS measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p.29. 
185 UNCTAD Course on dispute settlement 3.9 SPS measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13,p. 30. 
186 Ibid, p. 31. 
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With regard to the first element, the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones, held that 
governments often establish their appropriate levels of production on a case-by-case basis 
over time as risks arise, thus the goal is not absolute or perfect consistency, but only the 
avoidance of arbitrary or unjustifiable inconsistencies.187 
 
On the second element, the Appellate Body in the EC-Hormones set out the requirements 
required for a violation to be shown. They are not isolated but cumulative in nature, and 
they are:  
(i) The member has set its own level of protection in different situations.  
(ii) The levels of protection show arbitrary or unjustifiable differences in their 
treatment of different situations; and 
(iii) These arbitrary or unjustifiable differences lead to discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade.188  
3.6.1      Level of protection in different situations 
 
With this regard the Appellate Body in the EC-Hormones case held that comparison of 
several levels of sanitary protection deemed appropriate by a member is necessary if a 
panel’s inquiry under article 5.5 is to proceed at all. It went on to state that situations 
having different levels of protection cannot, of course, be compared unless they are 
comparable, that is, unless they present some common element or elements sufficient to 
render them comparable.189 In Australia-Salmon, comparable situations under article 5.5 
were those where either the same or similar disease, or where the same biological and 
economic consequences were involved.190 
3.6.2     Arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in levels of protection 
 
In the EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body held that there is a fundamental distinction 
between added hormones and naturally-occurring hormones in meat and other foods. In 
                                                 
187 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, WT/DS48/ABR para.213. 
188 Ibid, 214-215. 
189 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, WT/DS48/ABR para.217.  
190 Appellate Body Report, Australia-Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, para.146. 
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respect of the latter, the EC does not take any regulatory action thus to create such 
distinction, is an absurdity.191 
 
Distinctions that result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade 
The interpretation of article 5.5, in particular, the terms discrimination or a disguised  
restriction on international trade, have to be read in the context of the basic obligations 
contained in article 2.3, which requires that “sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall 
not be applied in a manner which would constitute  disguised restriction on international 
trade”[Emphasis added] 
 
Since the factors are cumulative in nature, it means that in case one of them is not 
complied with, then an allegation of inconsistency cannot be claimed by a party to the 
dispute. It has to prove all the three factors in order to rely on inconsistency.  
3.7    Application of Provisional measures  
 
Article 5.7 SPS Agreement, provides that a country can take up provisional SPS 
measures in cases where there is insufficient science evidence. Article 5.7 states: 
 
“In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including 
that form the relevant international organisations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures applied by other members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the 
sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.” 
 
Thus the article allows an exception to the obligation to base sanitary measures on a risk 
assessment (in cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient). But this exception 
is only a qualified one because it is only provisional measures that can be imposed. In the 
Japan-Agricultural Products II, the Appellate Body held that; 
 
                                                 
191Appellate Body Report, Australia-Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 221 
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“Article 5.7 operates as a qualified exemption from the obligation under Article 
2.2 not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific evidence. An 
overly broad and flexible interpretation of that obligation would render Article 5.7 
meaningless.”192   
 
Thus it follows that Article 5.7 operates not by the existence of scientific uncertainty, but 
rather by insufficiency of scientific evidence.193 This comes from the fact that it is only a 
provisional measure and not a permanent one. So a party cannot claim to have imposed a 
provisional measure basing on the uncertainty of scientific evidence. 
 
The Appellate Body in Japan- Agricultural Products identified four requirements for 
provisional measures under Article 5.7 to be consistent with the disciplines of the SPS 
Agreement and these include; 
 
• The measure is imposed in respect of a situation where relevant scientific 
information is insufficient. 
• The measure is adopted on the basis of available pertinent information  
• The Member must seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk, and 
• It must review the [sanitary and] phytosanitary measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time. 
3.7.1      Situations with insufficient scientific evidence 
 
In the Japan-Agricultural Products II, the Appellate Body held that Article 5.7 is 
triggered not by the existence of scientific uncertainty, but rather by the insufficiency of 
scientific evidence. The two concepts are not interchangeable.194 
 
                                                 
192 Appellate Body Report on Japan- Agricultural Products II, para. 80 
193 Bhala, R and Gantz, AD (2004) 21(2) WTO Case Review 2003, The Arizona Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, p.433 
194 Appellate Body, Japan-Agricultural Products II, WT/DS76AB/R, para.  184  
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3.7.2      Seek to obtain additional information 
 
The second element is to seek to obtain additional information. In Japan-Agricultural 
Products II, the Appellate Body held that in seeking additional information it would allow 
the member to conduct a more objective assessment of the risk.195  
 
Thus the two elements are so essential to rely on in the application of the provisions of 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. The first one, about insufficient evidence plays a role 
of not allowing countries to use their measures a protectionist tool. Otherwise they would 
be just alleging that a measure is justified because there is uncertainty in the scientific 
evidence. However, the fact that those countries have to base such provisional measures 
in situations where there is insufficient scientific evidence helps in the curtailing on the 
use of the measure as a protectionist tool. 
 
In respect to the last two requirements, the Appellate Body noted that the additional 
information sought by the member must be germane to conducting a risk assessment and 
the reasonable period of time had to be established on a case-by-case basis depending on 
the special circumstances of each case.   
 
Thus it suffices to point out that the provisions of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement are to 
the effect that when there is insufficient scientific evidence, a country can establish an 
SPS measure to protect it citizens. However on several occasions, countries tend to use 
these provisional measures as away to distort international trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
195 Appellate Body, Japan-Agricultural Products II, WT/DS76AB/R, para. 192. 
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3.8     Participation of SSA countries in the DSU 
 
Since the DSU’s inception, there have been 348 disputes brought for settlement.196 The 
Developing countries’ participation has greatly increased from the days of GATT. In its 
48 years of existence, GATT only handled an estimated 306 disputes197 and developing 
countries participation was minimal. But with the DSU, more developing countries have 
started engaging in the system, though, developing countries’ participation has been 
limited to the bigger developing countries whereas the smaller, weaker ones have not 
initiated a complaint at the WTO. This is not because they do not have trade disputes, but 
rather due to a combination of other factors, including but not limited to the following: 
 
• Africa is not a very active participant in the world trading system. 
• There is general lack of legal expertise in the WTO’s dispute settlement system.  
• Fear of political and /or economic pressure from the developed countries such as 
the European Union and the United States given the fact that Sub-Saharan African 
countries hugely depend on non-reciprocal trade arrangements like AGOA198 and 
the ACP-EU.199 It is only logical to abandon any interest in a case where there is a 
non-reciprocal trade arrangement. This is because you can not start a trade dispute 
with a country that has in the first place given you a chance to export in its 
market.   
• The available remedies; compensation and retaliation are practically 
unenforceable on part of most SSA Countries. For example, how can an LDC 
                                                 
196 As of 31st August 2006, 348 disputes had been referred to the WTO 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (accessed on the 1st of September 2006) 
197 Manduna, C (2004) “Africa’s Participation in the World Trade Organization’s DSU Process” p.3. 
198 AGOA is the Agricultural Growth Opportunity Act of the USA aimed at encouraging trade between 
SSA countries and the United States. It was passed in 2000. To date, there are 37 countries benefiting from 
this arrangement. www.agoa.gov (Accessed on the 15 September 2006). However, a few commodities are 
allowed particularly from the agricultural sector.  
199 The ACP-EU is the African Caribbean and Pacific- European Union which just like the AGOA is aimed 
at the promotion of trade between the Europe Union and the African Caribbean and Pacific countries. The 
European Union under the “Everything but Arms Initiative”, has allowed exportation of African products to 
the EU.  
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country retaliate against a developed country? The entire enforcement is based on 
trade war logic.200  
• Litigation using the DSU is quite costly, both financially and in terms of time. It 
is estimated that the procedure of instituting a trade dispute through up to the 
Appellate Body is US$500,000201 yet in terms of time it can take up to two 
years.202 Thus most SSA countries fail to pursue their legitimate trade rights. 
 
With such challenges, it is not too surprising that as of 20th January 2004, only two 
African countries; South Africa and Egypt had ever requested for consultations at the 
DSU.203 At the Appellate level, however, no African country has ever participated as 
either a Complainant or a Respondent. Participation has only been limited to third party 
status.  
 
This situation is worrisome on part on the SSA countries as they let their trade interests 
be determined by other countries yet the SPS Agreement applies to both Developed and 
Developing Countries alike.   
 
3.9     Conclusion 
 
The SPS Agreement has two main aims; one is encouraging international trade and the 
other allowing countries to maintain the appropriate levels of health standards that they 
deem necessary but which are scientifically justifiable. As most of the WTO Agreements, 
the SPS Agreement is aimed at promoting international trade. The Panel and Appellate 
Body have also tried to promote trade in as far as the interpretation of the SPS Agreement 
is concerned. But analysing some of the provisions of the SPS Agreement as interpreted 
by the WTO’s competent bodies, it has been clearly shown that a majority are ambiguous 
and they need amendment or reconsideration.  
  
                                                 
200 Jensen, MF (2002) “Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country Perspective” p. 20. 
201 Manduna, C (2004) “ Africa’s Participation in the World Trade Organization’ s DSU Process” p.2 
202 Ibid 
203 Ibid 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 4  
 
CHALLENGES AND IMPACT OF THE SPS AGREEMENT ON SUB- SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.0   INTRODUCTION 
 
A successful liberation of international trade created more opportunities for developing 
countries (DCs) to easily access developed countries’ markets.204 Thus the developing 
countries are increasingly under pressure to improve their delivery of food and animal 
products as a prerequisite for entering the competitive arena of international trade.205 As 
for the Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries, their requirements are even more 
substantial. The SSA countries consist of 47 African countries, geographically lying 
below the Sahara desert, and most are among the world’s poorest countries— normally 
referred to as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).206 To many SSA countries, 
agricultural and food products are of particular importance. For example, during 1980-
1997, agricultural and food products accounted for over 25% of the total merchandise 
exports from SSA. Agriculture itself accounts for 61% of the total employment and 14% 
of the GDP in DCs and 85% of employment and 36% of the GDP in LDCs.207 These 
                                                 
204 Henson, S., & Loader, R (2000) “Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries: The Role 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements” Elsevier Science Ltd, 2000, p.85. 
205 Bruckner, GK (2005) “Evaluation of the Alternatives and Possibilities for Countries in Sub- Saharan 
Africa to Meet the Sanitary Standards for Entry into the International Trade in Animals and Animal 
Products” TRALAC Working Paper No 6/ 2005 p.2. 
206 There are basically 47 countries categorised as falling in the category of the Sub-Saharan Africa. They 
are; Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic), Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Réunion, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Western Sahara, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Some are quite developed, 
such as South Africa and Nigeria, but a majority fall under the Least Developed Countries category.  
207 World Bank, (1999) ‘‘The World Bank Support for Developing Countries on International Trade Issue’’ 
at http://web.world bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT.html, (Accessed on 20 September 
2006).  
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statistics establish the undoubted significance of the agricultural base in this region. Due 
to the introduction of sanitary and phytosanitary measures under the application of the 
SPS Agreement, the SSA countries have faced a number of challenges and obstacles over 
and above the mere compliance with sanitary standards before a successful entry into the 
export market.  
 
With the successful reduction in barriers to trade in agricultural and food products, 
including tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other trade barriers through the Uruguay 
Round, there are more opportunities for the exportation of SSA agricultural products to 
developed countries’ markets. However, the liberalisation of tariff and quantitative 
restrictions have increased concerns over the impact of other measures, many of which 
are explicitly trade-related on agricultural and food exports208 including the SPS 
Agreement.  
 
Generally when tariffs are allowed, there is no general permission for non-tariff 
measures. For example, a member cannot generally prohibit or restrict the importation of 
goods into its territory or the exportation of goods from its territory. There are specific 
preconditions for such non-tariff measures, which can be taken only through prescribed 
procedures.209 But with the SPS Agreement, concerns have been expressed, that 
developing countries lack the resources to participate effectively in the institutions of the 
WTO and thus may be unable to exploit the opportunities provided by the Agreement.210  
The SPS measures are set up by the international standard setting organisations, and there 
are various measures which need to be examined. 
 
                                                 
208 Henson, S., & Loader, R (2000) “Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries: The Role 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements.” Elsevier Science Ltd, 4. 
209 Lal Das, B (1999) The WTO: A Guide to the Framework for International Trade, Zed Books Ltd, 
London, 11. 
210 Ibid. 
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4.1   Some SPS Measures that affect SSA countries.  
 
There are various SPS measures established that are aimed at the protection of human, 
animal and plant life or health. But below are some of which affect international trade, 
particularly from the SSA perspective.  
 
The international standards affecting food and food stuff are set by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC), which is an institution attached to WTO and the Food 
and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), while for the animals and plants, they are set by the 
OIE and the IPPC. The CAC sets standards to ensure the safety of the consumers and 
circumvent the use of standards for trade protection purposes. It sets, Maximum Residual 
Levels (MRL) for agricultural and veterinary chemical residues, as well as Maximum 
Permissible Concentrations (MPC) for heavy metals such as cadmium, lead and mercury 
and Extraneous Limits (ERL) for some of the environmental contaminants in foods.211  
 
Among the SSA countries, the EU is known for its most stringent SPS standards that 
hinder market access to their agricultural products.212 In most cases the SPS standards 
established by the EU are often more stringent than the CAC and the US level. No 
wonder the European Communities (EC) has been a respondent more times than any 
other country or member state as far as the SPS trade disputes are concerned.213 For 
example, the EU proposal pertaining to the Maximum Pesticide Residuals Limits (MRL), 
stipulates that for most of the tropical crops, MRL should be set at an analytical zero 
                                                 
211 Gebrehiwet, YF (2004) “Quantifying the Trade Effects of Sanitary and Phtyosanitary Regulations in 
OECD Countries on South African Food Exports”, p.63 Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension 
and Rural Development, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of Pretoria. Available 
at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-08272004-072352/unrestricted/00dissertation.pdf (Accessed on 
12 October 2006). 
212 Henson, S., & Loader, R. (2000) “Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries: The Role 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements.”, Elsevier Science Ltd. p.4.  
213 Out of the 5 disputes in which a violation of the SPS Agreement ahs been invoked, the European 
Communities (EC) has been a respondent 2 times (the EC-Hormones & EC-Biotech) as compared to the 
next in line being Australia, with 2 cases but some being repeated for implementation (under 21.5 DSU). 
Data obtained at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c5s2p1_e.htm  It should 
be recalled that state members have only challenged the SPS measures for being high, and not for being too 
low. Thus, the EC’s measures are more strict, a factor which has affected a lot of SSA exports. 
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level, which implies that a zero tolerance level for any pesticide residue.214 Since the 
standards of most tropical crops do not exist in CAC, there is a serious concern that these 
stringent standards by the EU have a negative impact SSA access to international 
markets.215 
 
Developed countries also use other SPS standards such the detection of aflatoxins in 
foodstuffs. Aflatoxins are cancer-causing chemicals produced by species of Aspergillus. 
Aflatoxins are cancer-causing chemicals produced by species of Aspergillus moulds that 
can develop on some plants. The spores of these moulds are present anywhere in the air 
or soil and require specific temperature, moisture and nutrient substrates to germinate.216 
They first attracted attention because of the turkey disease in 1960s.217 The measures 
regarding aflotoxins have mainly affected the trade in groundnuts. With this regard, 
Gambia has been the worst hit.218  
 
The various SPS standards either by the international standard setting organisations or the 
developed countries, have posed a number of challenges and difficulties for the SSA 
countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
214 By setting the Maximum Residual Levels (MRL) at analytical zero level, the effect is that there is a zero 
tolerance for any pesticide residues in the fruits and all crops. This is quite difficult to maintain given the 
fact that some pesticides are used by the SSA farmers in the eradication of pests and diseases in crops.  
215 Gebrehiwet, YF  (2004) “Quantifying the Trade Effects of Sanitary and Phtyosanitary Regulations in 
OECD Countries on South African Food Exports”, p.63 Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension 
and Rural Development, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of Pretoria. Available 
at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-08272004-072352/unrestricted/00dissertation.pdf (Accessed 12 
October 2006). p.63. 
216 Wilson, SJ & Sewadeh, M (2001) “A Race to the Top? A Case of Food Safety Standards and African 
Exports” p.7  Available at, 
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2001/03/30/000094946_0103
2007445741/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. (Accessed on 25 October 2006). 
217 Frank, CLU (2003) 7“Assessment of Safety/ Risk Vs Public Health Concerns: Aflatoxins & 
Hepatocarcinoma”, Environmental Health & Preventive Medicine, 235.  
218 Wilson, SJ & Sewadeh, M (2001) “A Race to the Top? A Case of Food Safety Standards and African 
Exports” p. 8 Available at, 
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2001/03/30/000094946_0103
2007445741/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. (Accessed on 25 October 2006). 
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4.2   Challenges facing SSA with regard to the SPS Agreement 
 
A number of challenges confront SSA countries in participating in the SPS Agreement 
and taking full advantage of the trade opportunities created. They range from lack of 
resources to the high standards set by the developed countries as well as the international 
standards setting organisations. The potential challenges are covered below;  
4.2.1   Harmonisation of international standards. 
 
The preferred tool used in the SPS Agreement to achieve its goal is international 
harmonisation.219 Harmonisation is broadly defined as the process of making different 
domestic laws, regulations, principles and government policies substantially or 
effectively the same or similar.220 In terms of SPS measures, it refers to adopting the 
same or similar international standards. The international standards referred to in the SPS 
Agreement are to date limited to those established by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC) for food safety, the International Office of Epizootics (IOE) for 
animal health and zooneses and the organisations established under the Secretariat of the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).221 Thus, Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
standards established by those three sister organisations are widely recognised as the 
international standards and countries should harmonise their SPS standards basing on 
those legal foundations.222 A country can, nevertheless establish its own measure as long 
as it is scientifically justifiable.223 Accordingly, SSA countries can only actualise the 
potential benefits of the SPS Agreement if they are willing and able to participate fully in 
the institutions established by the SPS Agreement for the formulation of SPS measures.  
 
                                                 
219 Jensen, MF (2002) “Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country Perspective” p.22. 
220 Mayeda, G. “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of Harmonisation 
on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law Vol. 7 No. 4, Oxford University 
Press, 737 p.740. 
221 Pauwelyn, J (2003) Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Rules of 
International Public Law, Cambridge University Press, p.349. 
222 Mayeda, G. (2004) 7(4) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law Vol. 7 No. 4, Oxford 
University Press, 737 at 740. 
223 The SPS Agreement, Article 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 57
4.2.2   Composition of the international standard setting organisations. 
 
Article 10.4 of the SPS Agreement provides that state members should encourage and 
facilitate the active participation of DCs in the relevant organisations such as the CAC, 
IPPC and IOE. This provision, however, contains no binding obligation on part of the 
developed countries to assist the developing countries.224 Thus, one finds that the 
standard setting organisations are dominated by the developed countries and what 
developed countries consider as the appropriate level, automatically becomes the 
standard which the SSA countries must adhere to.225 With their minimal participation in 
the standard setting organisations, the SSA countries have taken on the role of ‘standards 
takers.’ According to a study by Wilson & Abiola (2003), they refer to SSA countries as 
becoming “standards takers” due to their apparent lack of participation in international 
standards setting activities.226  
 
Due to their non-participation in the standard setting, SSA countries end up with 
standards set at levels inappropriate to their situation or which require a standards 
infrastructure which simply does not exist in their countries.227 This is because some of 
the standards were set even before the SPS Agreement came into effect. To Oyejide, 
Ogunkola, and Bankole, ‘various standards were not developed as part of the WTO 
process and ignored the developing countries.’228 At the same time standards are less 
likely to be developed where the developed countries have no interest. Thus, to Bruckner, 
the result is that ‘non-participatory countries are forced to accept and try to meet initial 
                                                 
224 Course on Dispute Settlement, 3.9 SPS measures UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p. 54. 
225 With regard to membership in the international standard setting organisations such as the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Office of the International Epizootics and the International Plant Protection 
Convention, while 64% of upper-middle and high-income countries are members of all three organisations, 
only 33% of low and low-income countries are [Henson, S & Loader, R., ‘Barriers to Agricultural Exports 
from Developing Countries: The Role of Sanitary Requirements’ 29:1 World Development 85 (2001) 96. 
The data was obtained from WTO documentation for June 1999. Income groups were those defined by the 
World Bank.] quoted in Mayeda, G., p.752 
226 Wilson, J.S, & Abiola, V.O, (2003) “Standards and Global Trade: A Voice for Africa” World Bank, 
Washington DC, p.3. 
227 Jensen, M.F (2002) “Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country Perspective” p. 23. 
228 Oyejide, TA and Ogunkola, EO, and Bankole, AB “Quantifying the Trade Impact of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards: What is Known and Issues of importance for Sub Saharan Africa” in Maskus, 
K.E., & Wilson, J.S (Eds.), (2001) Quantifying the Impact of Technical Barriers to Trade: Can it be done? 
The University of Michigan Press, 2001 at p. 213. 
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standards by reacting to ever-changing standards that do not accommodate unique 
constraints pre-existing in local environments.’229  
 
On the other hand, however, since DCs lack institutional capacities, they cannot 
contribute effectively towards the standards setting.230 Zarrilli is of the view that ‘the low 
participation of developing countries in international standard setting organisations has 
hampered the representation of their interests and concerns regarding international SPS 
standards.’231 While Mayeda pointed out that ‘it makes sense for international bodies to 
adopt standards rather than rules that require less investment on the part of developing 
countries for evaluating the suitability of the regulations for their domestic context.’232 It 
suffices to point out that while it is correct that the poor participation of the SSA 
countries in the international standard setting organisations has made it difficult for them 
to ‘voice’ out their interests and grievances, but at the same time it would be important to 
address the positive side of the harmonisation of standards. 
4.2.3   Effect of harmonisation on SSA countries 
 
Harmonisation of SPS standards can reduce compliance costs of developing countries by 
reducing the number of standards with which developing countries would have to 
comply, but, in practice, harmonisation also has the potential to place disproportionate 
burdens on SSA countries.233 This is because of the lack of adequate resources and 
institutional capacities in place to put those measures into place. 
 
                                                 
229 Bruckner, G. k., (2005) “An Evaluation of the Alternatives and possibilities for countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa to meet the Sanitary Standards for entry into the International Trade in Animals and Animal 
Products.” TRALAC Working Paper No. 6/2005, p.11. 
230 Mayeda G, (2004) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law Vol. 7 No. 4, Oxford 
University Press, 737 p.753 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid. Harmonisation has the potential to reduce the costs for domestic industries exporting to different 
markets. If a manufacturer faces significantly different requirements in each jurisdiction for which it 
manufactures, it will not be able to achieve economies of scale beyond its market share for one jurisdiction. 
Harmonisation can allow manufacturers even in SSA to enjoy economies of scale. 
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Much as harmonisation of the SPS measures can lead to a reduction of compliance costs 
on the one hand, by reducing the number of standards with which the developing 
countries would have to comply, but on the other hand, it may lead to increase in the 
compliance costs,234 which is of significance to the SSA countries. But at the same time, 
it leads to countries especially the developed ones to lower their SPS standards because 
the SPS agreement is not a public health agreement but rather a trade agreement.235 This 
may, however, be against the public health policy of a country to protect its citizens. 
Thus, many governments in developed countries face stiff resistance from consumer 
organisations, a factor which sometimes has led to the upward retention of the SPS 
standards, at the detriment of the SSA countries’ agricultural exports. But all in all, in a 
bid to meet the internationally recognised standards, SSA countries are faced with the 
problem of high compliance costs.  
4.3   Compliance Costs 
 
Compliance with the SPS measures entails costs to exporting countries, which may have 
disparate impact on developing countries, and more particularly to the SSA countries, 
many of whom do not have adequate institutional frameworks or financial resources in 
place to monitor and assess compliance.236 It should be recalled that prior to the Uruguay 
Round, implementation of the trade liberalisation agreements was a minor issue. But the 
new issues included in the Uruguay Round have put emphasis on implementation costs, 
which go to reforms that involve spending resources on building new public agencies, 
and educating personnel237 in both risk assessment and management as far as the SPS 
Agreement is concerned.  
 
                                                 
234 Mayeda, G (2004) 7(4) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University 
Press, 2004, 737 p.752. 
235 Silverglade, BA (2000)55 “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures: Weakening 
Food Regulation to facilitate Trade?” The Food & Drug Law Journal, Food Drug L.J 517, p. 520. 
236 Mayeda, G (2004) 7(4) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University 
Press, 2004, 737 p.752. 
237 Jensen, MF (2002) “Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country Perspective”, p.30. 
 
 
 
 
 60
The compliance costs can either relate to compliance with importing country standards or 
the cost of conformity assessment procedures.238 Again, these may include access to the 
resources required to comply with SPS standards in developed countries, like; obtaining 
information on SPS standards, scientific and technical expertise, appropriate 
technologies, skilled labour, and general finances.239  
 
Compliance costs are inordinately high for the developed countries in general but might 
be multiplied on part of the SSA countries. Thus the most effective solution to the 
compliance costs would lie in the compliance period granted to SSA countries to be 
longer, to enable them meet some the SPS measures. 
4.3.1   Compliance period  
 
The period allowed for compliance with international set SPS measures is an important 
factor in determining the compliance costs.240 The SPS Agreement provides that when 
new measures are introduced, member states should accord longer periods of time to DCs 
particularly the LDCs so as to maintain opportunities for their exports.241 In the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) it was discussed and the developed countries were 
encouraging the issue to be resolved on a case-by-case basis while the developing 
countries were positioning themselves towards a blanket extension of the compliance 
period.242 To Mayeda, neither position is tenable because ‘hearing applications for 
extensions on a case-by-case basis is time consuming and expensive yet a blanket 
extension seems inappropriate when different countries have different capacities for 
meeting their obligations.’243 However, the Decision on Implementation adopted at the 
                                                 
238 Henson, S, Loader, R., (1999) 15 “Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards on Developing 
Countries and the Role of the SPS Agreement”, Agribusiness, 355, 359.  
239 Henson, et al (2000) M. “Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures on Developing Countries.” 
University of Reading, 2001 p.40. 
240 Mayeda G (2004) 7(4) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University 
Press, 737 p.757.   
241 The SPS Agreement, Article 10.2. 
242 Mayeda G (2004) 7(4) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University 
Press, 737 p.757.  
243 Ibid, 759. 
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Doha Ministerial Conference has increased the adaptation period to no less than six 6 
months or where necessary countries can come up to a conclusion.244 
 
The period seems to be sufficiently long for the developed member states, but given the 
SSA lack of adequate resources, both financial and technical, the compliance period 
remains short and if exporters do not comply within the specified period they may be 
prevented from exporting.245 Thus, SSA countries need technical assistance in order to 
meet most of the SPS standards set by the standard setting organisations.  
4.0 Technical Assistance to SSA countries 
 
In order to help developing countries to adjust to, or comply with their developed trading 
partners’ SPS requirements, the SPS Agreement encourages members to provide 
technical assistance in areas such as processing technologies, research, infrastructure and 
training.246 The formulation of Article 9 of the SPS is, however, vague and it does not 
contain any commitments.247 This is one of the reasons why developed countries have not 
lived up to their obligations in as far as the provision of technical assistance is concerned. 
So, SSA countries have to find a way of promoting their exports in agricultural products 
to the developed countries by building institutional capacities. But building institutional 
capacities for the implementation of the SPS Agreement requires information and 
technology transfer, as well as financial support to facilitate such transfers.248 The 
question, therefore remains as to what would be the better way to solve the difficulties 
relating to provision of technical assistance? 
 
                                                 
244 WT/MIN (01)/17, dated 14 November 2001. Also available in Course on Dispute Settlement, 3.9 SPS 
Measures, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.13, p. 54. 
245 Henson, SJ Loader, R.J Swinbank, A Bredahl, M & Lux, M (2000) “Impact of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures on Developing Countries.” University of Reading, United Kingdom, 40.  
246  WTO Secretariat, “Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements” p.245 Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/guide_ur_deving_country_e.pdf. Technical assistance is also 
provided for in the SPS Agreement, Article 9. 
247 Jensen, M.F., (2002) “Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country Perspective” p.27. 
248 Mayeda, G (2004) 7(4) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University 
Press, 737 at 760. 
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Zarrilli recommends strengthening Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement,249 which relates to 
technical assistance to require it to specifically reconsider SPS measures that create 
difficulties for DCs.250 Another solution would be to require developed countries to 
subsidize the fees charged to DCs for the conformity assessment procedures for products 
under the SPS Agreement.251 This would be in the form of grants, loans, or real technical 
expertise at a lesser cost provided to SSA countries in order to enable them meet the 
required SPS standards as provided for by article 9.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
 
To Mayeda, however, ‘if obligations of developed countries to provide technical 
assistance to help DC members comply with the SPS measure ‘were made actionable’ 
this could go a long way towards making the implementation of technical assistance 
provision a reality rather than a dream.’252 However, if the cause of action upon which an 
SSA member is to institute legal proceedings upon the failure by a developed country to 
accord technical assistance to an SSA country, then that would give rise to injustices. 
Compelling developed countries would be unfair because they also have other areas to 
attend to in terms of their own economies and above all such a system would be difficult 
to enforce. 
Thus, one would remain to wonder whether the SPS Agreement does really serve one of 
its purposes, the promotion of international trade other than being an impediment to 
international trade.  
 
 
                                                 
249 Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that where substantial investments are required in order for 
an exporting developing member, the latter shall consider providing such technical assistance as will permit 
the developing country member to maintain and expand its market access opportunities for the Product 
involved.  
250 Zarrilli, S. “The Agreement on the Application of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures: Issues for 
Developing Countries”, South centre p.24 available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/snp/snp-
04.htm (accessed on the 15th September 2006). 
251 Baldwin, RE, (2001) “Regulatory Protectionism, Developing Nations and Two- Tier World Trade 
System” p. Otsuki, T, Wilson, JS & Sewadeh, M (2001) 26 “Saving Two in a Billion: Quantifying the 
Trade Effect of European Food Safety Standards on African Exports” Food Policy, 495. 
252 Mayeda, G (2004) 7(4) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law, Oxford University 
Press, 737 at 760. 
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4.5   Genuine SPS standards: A haven for trade impediment?  
 
In general, from the SSA perspective, SPS standards can impede trade even when they 
are imposed on genuine health and safety considerations because of additional 
compliance cost.253 For example, some SPS standards have been designed by developed 
countries to reflect their technological advancement and consumer preferences, which 
may or may not be appropriate for SSA. Upgrading existing SPS standards or developing 
new ones and performing risk assessments is a costly and difficult procedure, and it is 
neither technically feasible nor economically affordable for most developing countries.254 
Resources, manpower and institutional constraints are naturally more binding for SSA 
exporters compared to their developed-country counterparts. In addition, when there is no 
harmonisation, SPS standards sometimes diverge considerably across importing 
countries, making meeting standards costly and cumbersome for exporters.  
 
In addition, the cost of compliance might even be higher than the trade benefits to some 
of the countries. Thus, it can be suggested that the SPS Agreement, though prima facie is 
viewed as a market access promoting agreement through streamlining the SPS measures 
by harmonisation, at the same time it acts as an impediment to trade either by accident or 
design in terms of the compliance costs associated with it especially on part of the SSA 
countries. Thus WTO stated:  
 
“Although considerable resources may be needed to raise health standards to 
international levels, the benefits are not limited to agricultural exporters. In fact, the most 
important benefits from improvements in the food safety situation within a country are 
for the local population, through improvements in health. In a parallel fashion, improving 
                                                 
253 Athukorola, P-C & Jayasuriya, S (2003) “Food Safety Issues, Trade and WTO Rules: A Developing 
Country Perspective” Available at 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/economics/publish/papers/aciar/aciar_2003_athukorala_jayasuriya.pdf (Accessed on 
20 October 2006). 
254 Finger, J. Michael and Philip Schuler (2002), ‘’Implementation of WTO Commitments: The 
Development Challenge’ in Hoekman, B.,  Mattoo, A & English, P. (Eds) (2002), Development, Trade and 
the WTO: A Handbook, Washington DC: World Bank, 493-503, p. 23. 
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the animal health and plant health situation within African countries also brings benefits 
to local producers, irrespective of their interest in export markets.”255 
 
Thus, the question would remain that raising health standards to international levels in the 
way required by the agreement yield substantial benefits to domestic consumers and 
producers and if so, are they achieved in a cost minimising way?   
 
Apart from the challenges faced by the SSA countries in complying with the SPS 
standards, it is imperative to explore whether the developed countries are on top of 
stringent SPS measures, are using other means to defeat the ability of DCs to gain access 
to their markets. 
4.6    Rules of origin  
 
Rules of origin specify the conditions under which a good becomes eligible for zero 
tariffs in a Free Trade Areas (FTA).256 Rules of origin have had a significant impact on 
the success of particular trade sectors in which many DCs participate. For example, the 
agricultural sectors of textile and clothing industry,257 yet in most cases these are the 
sectors where the DCs are more vigilant and which have been used in the trade 
preferences between developed countries and their developing counterparts. It is 
estimated that the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) passed by the United 
States in 2000 only allows SSA countries to realise 19-26% of the benefits that they 
could have realised had rules of origin not been applied.258 This is because the 
preferential access granted to products from African countries are at the same time 
                                                 
255 WTO Secretariat quoted in Jensen, M.F, “Reviewing the SPS Agreement: A Developing Country 
Perspective” p. 32. 
256 Krishna, K. (2005) “Understanding Rules of Origin” National Bureau of Economic Research, p.1 
Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11150.pdf  (Accessed on the 12th September 2006). 
257 Mayeda, G (2004) 7(4) “Developing Disharmony? The SPS & TBT Agreements and the Impact of 
Harmonisation on Developing Countries.” Journal of the International Economic Law, Vol. 7 No. 4, 
Oxford University Press, 737 p.757. 
258 Mattoo, A. Roy, D & Subramanian, A (2003) “The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and Its Rules of 
Origin: Generosity Undermined?” The World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2908, 11 October 2002, available at http://econ.world bank.org/view.php?id=20742 
(accessed on the 20th of September 2006) p.17. 
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limited to certain products259 and it imposes strict rules of origin on many of the products 
granted access to the USA market. Thus Mattoo et al analysed the trade impact of rules 
of origin on the African countries exports and stated: 
 
“ …When we compare the benefits that will accrue to African countries under the AGOA 
against the second benchmark, of fully unrestricted access, which is the level that Africa’ 
s trade would have attained had the United States (i) not excluded any product from the 
scope of AGOA and (ii) not imposed stringent rules of origin requirements to qualify for 
the benefits under it [we observe that] AGOA as it is now stands will yield only 19-26 
percent of the benefits that could have been provided if access had been unconditional. 
Nearly 80 percent of this shortfall is accounted for by the rules of origin requirements in 
the apparel sector which will significantly reduce exports below SSA’s full potential.”260 
 
Thus the SSA region which is the sole beneficiary of the AGOA initiative, has been 
denied the right to fully access the US market on a clumsy ground of rules of origin, yet 
some of the SSA exporters can obtain merchandise from other countries in Africa which 
are not benefiting from the AGOA. In addition, even if the US has provided the 
opportunity to SSA countries to penetrate its market, at the same time, it imposes very 
stringent SPS standards that sometimes cannot be met.  
 
As most of the agricultural commodities are enjoying duty free access to the EU and 
USA, a survey conducted by Henson & Loader (2000) suggests that failure to comply 
with the stringent SPS standards established by the EU and USA will greatly undermine 
the preference given to African countries in the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative of the 
EU261 and the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA)262 of the US.  
                                                 
259 The AGOA initiative allows African countries to export to the USA only products from agricultural 
sector, but from the textile and clothing sector being encouraged more.  
260 Mattoo, A Roy, D & Subramanian, A (2003) “The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and Its Rules of 
Origin: Generosity Undermined?” The World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2908, 11 October 2002, available at http://econ.world bank.org/view.php?id=20742 
(accessed on the 20th of September 2006) p.17. 
261 Everything But Arms (EBA) is a trade initiative from the European Union started in 2001 allowing 
African products into the European market on duty free. Data available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/eba/index_en.htm (Accessed on 10 October 2006). 
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Thus it suffices to suggest that the developed countries give on the one hand the 
opportunity to SSA countries to export in their markets, but at the same time use the 
stringent SPS measures to take away such opportunities. But little can be done in this 
respect, because if a country gives you a right to access its market, the exporting country 
should be obliged to export only goods that are of good quality. 
4.6    Impact of the Imposition of SPS standards on SSA countries 
 
Yet many SSA countries are finding it difficult to meet the SPS measures of the 
developed countries, and are concerned that in practice, their access to export markets for 
some food and agricultural products is being hindered, rather than encouraged in the 
wake of the SPS Agreement.263 It is imperative to assess the impact of the SPS 
Agreement and its measures on export of SSA countries as away to identify means by 
which to reduce possible effects. But, unlike the trade impact of tariffs and quota 
restrictions which can be easily quantified, non-tariff barriers, healthy and safety 
standards inclusive are difficult to quantify. Irrespective of that belief, there is a wide 
recognition that SPS measures can act either explicitly or implicitly as a barrier to trade 
in a similar manner to tariffs and quantitative restrictions.264   
 
According to Henson & Loader (2000), trade impacts of the SPS measures can be 
conveniently grouped into three categories;265 
 
• They can prohibit trade by imposing an import ban or by prohibitively increasing 
production and market access costs.266 This is because of the stringent SPS 
                                                                                                                                                 
262 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). It is a trade initiative by the United States to the 
currently 37 countries in the SSA region, where they get to export their products into the US market duty 
free. http://www.agoa.gov/ (Accessed on 21 October 2006). 
263 Bourtrif, & Pineiro, M (2002) “The New International Trade Context for Developing Countries: The 
Impact of the SPS & TBT Agreements”, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), 
Food Quality and Standards Service, 2002, Rome Italy p.3.   
264 Petrey & Johnson (1993), Ndayisenga & Kinsey (1994), Thilmay & Barrett (1997), Hillman 1997, 
Sykes 1995, Unnevehr, 1999, Mayeda 2004, Henson et al 2000 & 2001. All these authors have 
acknowledged that SPS measures can and do act to impede trade in agricultural and food products.  
265 Henson, SJ et al (2000) “Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures on Developing Countries.” 
University of Reading, United Kingdom p.40. 
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standards set coupled with the lack of technical and financial resources on part of 
the developing countries to maintain high standards. Also there is a general lack 
of institutional capacities in most SSA countries, a factor that limits productivity 
and increases market access costs.  
 
• SPS measures can divert from one trading partner to another by laying down 
regulations that discriminate across potential suppliers. This can be by way of 
setting the standards that SSA cannot fulfil, thus indirectly diverting trade from 
one trading partner to another. 
• They can reduce overall trade flows by increasing costs or raising barriers for all 
potential suppliers.267  
 
To date, the trade impacts of SPS measures have been most widely acknowledged in a 
developed country context.268 For example, Thornsbury, Roberts, De Remer & Orden 
(1997) estimated the total impact of technical barriers on US exports of agricultural 
products in 1996 was US$ 4,907 million. Of this, 90% was due to measures covered by 
the SPS Agreement.269  
 
However, some studies have been done, addressing the issue of SPS measures and 
developing countries’ exports though in most circumstances limited to costs of 
compliance and their impact on the SSA trade in agricultural products. Mutasa & 
Nyamandi (1998) assessed the degree to which SPS requirements impede exports of 
agricultural and food products from African countries through a survey of CAC contact 
points. Out of the countries that responded, 57% indicated that their agricultural products 
had been rejected following border inspection, due to microbiological/ spoilage or 
contamination.270 Thus the total costs of rejection at the importing countries border of 
SSA agricultural exports due to the SPS measures include the loss of product value, 
                                                                                                                                                 
266 Ibid 
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268 Ibid p.89  
269 Ibid 
270 Mutasa MP & Nyamandi T (1998), Report of the survey on the identification of food regulations and 
standards within the Africa Region Codex and Harmonisation of Food Trade. Paper presented at a 
workshop on Codex and Harmonisation of Food Regulations, Harare August 1998, p.4. 
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storage and transport costs due to border inspections.271 To many of the SSA countries’ 
exporters such expenses deter them from fully exploiting the opportunities offered in the 
developed countries.   
 
Another study done by Otsuki, Wilson & Sewadeh, in assessing the EU standard on the 
level of aflotoxin B1, estimated that while the EU standard of 2ppm would reduce health 
risks by approximately 2.3 deaths per billion per year when compared CAC standard on 
the level of 9ppm, the cost would be a reduction of African exports of US $ 670 million, 
which is a 64% reduction in exports over the level of exports at the international 
standard.272 
 
Thus, in light of the above statistics, it can be suggested that even if it is every country’s 
sovereign right to protect its citizens, it is rather unimaginable to save 2.3 lives against a 
vast number of people who would benefit from the estimated loss of US$ 670 million. 
Thus one would suggest that even if the SPS Agreement is aimed at the protection of 
human, animal and plant life or health, it is at the same time supposed to balance that 
aspiration with promotion of international trade. 
 
Having discussed some of the trade impacts of the SPS measures, now this discussion 
turns to a highlight of a few case studies where the SPS Agreement has been 
implemented upon the SSA countries.  
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4. 7    The European Union Ban on fish and fish products from East Africa 
 
The EU has on a number of occasions imposed bans on the fish imports from Lake 
Victoria, which is the main source of fisheries for Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.273 The 
first ban was due to detection of salmonella in fish, in 1997. Due to elevated levels of 
cholera around the region, in late 1997 further inspection were conducted which led to 
restrictions that involved testing at the port of entry to the EU for vibro cholera.274 The 
third ban was imposed as a result of fish poisoning on Lake Victoria during 1999-2000. 
To the EU, the East African countries had failed to enforce the Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP)275 as required.276 
  
The bans on the fisheries sector in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania cost the agricultural 
sector both at macro and micro level. Another study done by Henson, Brouder & 
Mitullah, reveals that at the macro level, the Nile perch export dropped by 64% and the 
total fish exports fell by 24%.277 They also assessed that in Tanzania, the incomes of 
fishermen who had become dependant on exports to the EU declined by 80% during the 
period of the second round of restrictions.278  
                                                 
273 Henson, S Brouder AM & Mitullah, W (2000) 5 “Food Safety Requirements and Food Exports from 
Developing Countries: A Case of Fish Exports from Kenya to the European Union”, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 1159, 1164. 
274 Henson et al (2000) “Impact of the sanitary and phytosanitary measures on developing countries” 
University of Reading, United Kingdom, p.35. 
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in the food industry as an effective approach to establishing good production, sanitation and manufacturing 
practices that produce safe foods. (Unnevehr, L.J., & Jensen, H.H., “The Economic Implications of Using 
HACCP as a food safety Regulatory Standard” p.3, Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa 
State University, available at http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/99wp228.pdf 
(accessed on the 20th of October 2006). 
276 Nyangito, H.O., (2002) “Post Doha Challenges in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary and Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement” p.5 A paper presented during the ABCDE- Europe conference 
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Trade Negotiations” Available at http://www.kippra.org/Download/OPNo4.pdf. (Accessed 15 October 
2006). 
277 Henson, S, Brouder AM, & Mitullah W (2000)5 “Food Safety Requirements and Food Exports from 
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On a micro level, McCormick and Mitullah (2002) estimated the cost of upgrading a 
single landing site or beach to meet international standards at US$ 1.2 million.279 
However, according to Henson and Mitullah, it is evident that there has been a tendency 
to over estimate the costs, perhaps as efforts to attract more significant donor support. 
Thus the Fisheries Department estimate the cost of basic beach improvements to be 
around US$ 99,000 per beach.280  
 
With regard to the Ugandan economy, it was estimated in a study done by Mussa, 
Vossenaar, & Waniala, that it incurred the following;281 
 
• An estimated loss of US$ 36.9 million over the period of the ban and loss to the 
fishermen community in terms of reduced prices and less activity of fishing estimated 
at US$ 1 million per month. 
 
• Out of 11 factories, which were operational at the time of the ban, three were 
completely closed and the rest operated at a 20% capacity, thus laying off 60-70% of 
the directly employed workers. Not to mention a number of those who were indirectly 
benefiting from the fish trade, like packaging, transport, and the overall economy 
were directly affected.  
 
Unfortunately, large companies are better placed to undertake additional investments 
needed to meet international SPS standards. Moreover, firms with foreign capital 
participation are likely to be better placed, compared to purely locally owned firms, to 
                                                 
279 McCormick, D & Mitullah, WV (2002) “Institutional Response to Global Perch Markets: The Case of 
Lake Victoria Fish Cluster.” Paper presented at the Conference of local African Food SYSTEMS: Products, 
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280 Henson, S & Mitullah, W (2004). “Kenyan Exports of Nile Perch: The Impact of Food Safety Standards 
on an Export-Oriented Supply Chain, p. 68 
Available at 
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meet SPS standards and/or to circumvent stringent standards.282 Yet most of the fish 
exporting firms are owned by foreigners and the locals are on small scale. This could be 
beneficial to a few people but not to the economy as a whole. This necessitates the need 
to upgrade beach sanitary facilities in order to make sure that all companies, whether 
large or small benefit. 
 
Thus all the three countries, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania had to invest enormous 
amounts of money in relation to equipment and technical capacity to inspect fish and 
implement quality control measures. Some countries, Uganda, for example, had to solicit 
for funds from the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) to 
invest in the competent authority and associated facilities.283  
4.7.1    Ban on Citrus Fruits in South Africa 
 
South Africa’s main export destination of citrus fruit is the EU market, which makes up 
65% of all citrus fruits of South Africa.284 In 2004, the EU and US established a Citrus 
Black Spot (CBS) standard that banned export of citrus from some parts of South Africa 
that inflicted revenue loss and increased cost compliance. The areas affected most were 
the Cape Province which is a predominantly citrus fruits growing area. 
 
Joost, Kruger & Kotze (2003), estimated the cost of compliance with the CBS for a 
company at an average revenue loss of 4% of the total revenue. The cost of complying is 
estimated at Rands 1.29 million. The government of South Africa spent between Rand 11 
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to 16.5 million during the 1995 season and between Rand 30-50 million between the 
1997 season on fungicides alone for pre-harvest control of CBS.285 
 
However, risk analysis using the latest scientific techniques show that CBS cannot spread 
to the EU because fruit exported to EU reaches when unfavourable climate prevails for 
the disease to germinate.286 Fruits have been exported to the EU since 1925, however, 
there has never been the occurrence of black spot on European Orchards. Thus, the recent 
phytosanitary standard regarding the CBS would appear to be a disguised restriction on 
South Africa’s citrus fruit export to the EU, which is not based on scientific justifications.  
4.7.2    The Zimbabwean Beef exports to the EU.  
 
Due to trade concessions granted to African countries under the Lome Convention,287 
Zimbabwe became a big exporter of beef to the EU market. There is little small-scale 
production of beef as a vast majority is produced at a large scale. Unfortunately, the 
sanitary standards laid down by the EU require full traceability of animals down the 
supply chain. For example, exporters have to demonstrate that the animals are from FMD 
free areas and are free from certain other diseases.288  
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4.7.3    Coffee from Cameroon and Ethiopia 
 
There is a widespread perception that buyers in Europe try to reduce the price on quality 
grounds due to quality problems especially moisture content in coffee. Although lacking 
in proper procedures and equipment, the crop worms such as the 12% moisture were well 
defined and known. Ethiopia’s case was due to as tested primarily for black beans and 
humidity. It was suggested that international n mixed quality attributable largely to sun 
drying and possible high moisture levels and although they could be sold they tended to 
attract much lower prices than the equivalent washed coffee crop (20% of exports).289 
 
Having looked at a few case studies about the impact of the application of the SPS 
measures on developing countries, one would wonder what the implications of the SPS 
measures on the SSA countries are. 
4.8     Implications of SPS Measures on SSA countries economies 
 
The SPS Agreement and measures have had enormous impact on trade for DCs 
especially the SSA countries. They are both negative and positive but unfortunately the 
negative ones outweigh the positive ones.  
4.8.1    Total Prohibition of trade by the SPS standards  
 
Some SPS standards can prohibit international trade because they are stringent. For 
example, an EU regulation requires that dairy products be manufactured from milk 
produced by cows kept on farms and milked mechanically.290 This regulation virtually 
precludes imports from many DCs especially the SSA countries where milk production is 
by and large a smallholder activity. The EU recently invoked this regulation to ban 
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import of camel cheese from Mauritania, bringing hardship to small scale enterprises, 
which developed the product at a considerable cost.291 
4.8.2    Certainty in SPS measures and requirements 
 
The SSA countries’ participation in international trade has been improved because of the 
harmonisation of the SPS measures and even in case a country establishes its own SPS 
measures, they are based on scientific evidence. The harmonisation of the SPS 
Agreement provides all countries with certainty as to what are the rules of exporting and 
the procedures as well as the requirements to be met by the exporters. All this 
information is available to the potential exporters.  
 
However, looking at the implications of the imposition of SPS measures on the 
economies of the DCs, first, in case a commodity does not meet the required export 
standards, it is still sold on the DCs’ markets. This might be because the exporters do not 
want to lose incomes totally, yet at the same time the SPS standards set by the DCs are 
lower than those acceptable internationally. For example, due to the high levels of 
aflatoxins in ground nuts in the Gambia, or the unacceptably high levels of Salmonella in 
fish from Kenya, Uganda Tanzania and Mozambique.292 However, this might threaten the 
welfare of local consumers due to the poor quality of the goods. 
 
On the other hand, the consumer welfare may also be compromised due to non-
availability of the products or due to a limited availability at high prices. This is because 
the SSA countries would be exporting to other countries as a result of the benefit of the 
SPS Agreement streamlining of an SPS measure applicable in the circumstances.  
 
Food safety is a ‘luxury’ good whose demand rises as income levels rise, and greater 
prosperity tends to be accompanied by increased demand for more stringent SPS 
standards in developed countries. Many in developed countries see the much laxer SPS 
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standards that often prevail in DCs as a threat precipitating ‘a race to bottom’.293 Thus the 
benefits of harmonisation of the SPS measures are under looked by the developed 
countries, as the DCs establish measures which are way below the level perceived to be 
the right one in developed countries. 
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, as traditional trade barriers such as tariff and 
quantitative restrictions continue to decline, protectionist interests are likely to make 
increasing use of food safety regulations and other technical barriers to block trade. This 
has been the case because of the position of the SSA countries.  
4.9    Is there away forward?  
 
As already discussed above, the main challenge to the SSA countries is the lack of 
adequate resources, both technical and financial. Thus, the best way of reducing the 
challenges of the SSA countries in as far as promoting their exports in agricultural 
produce is concerned is by way of assisting them in terms of resources. 
 
The developed countries have helped with regard to funding the activities of the WTO. In 
2001, the WTO allocated over US$ 1 million per year, slightly more than 1% of its total 
budget, for providing assistance to DCs in complying with the WTO. The World Bank 
(WB) in partnership with other international trade organisations such as the WTO, 
IMF294, UNCTAD295, and UNDP296 already provide support for DCs in the process of 
integrating into the international trading regime.297 In 2002, the WB and the WTO 
established a new fund to provide funding to DCs to assist them meet SPS standards. The 
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WB pledged US$300,000 and the WTO will contribute from the Doha Development 
Trust Fund.298 
 
Another challenge for SSA countries has been the failure to fully participate in the DSU 
of the WTO. Again, this is due to among other factors, mainly, the lack of adequate 
resources. The WTO together with some developed countries has set up a fund called the 
ACWL.299 It assists in providing DCs with legal assistance in terms of training trade 
lawyers as well provision of legal advice.300 In addition, there has been a fund established 
which operates on a budget of US$ 1 million, just reserved for legal assistance for DCs at 
a subsidised fee while for the LDCs, where a majority of SSA countries fall, it is free of 
charge.  
 
Thus on the overall, it can be concluded that there is a way forward as far as the SPS 
measures are concerned. This is because of the input in place for making the provisions 
of the SPS Agreement work. It should be borne in mind that the SPS Agreement is a 
relatively new trade agreement, having come into effect in 1995, thus, what has been 
done, has been quite assuring as far as the future holds for the SSA countries in meeting 
the standards set under the SPS Agreement.  
4.10   Conclusion 
 
The SPS Agreement applies equally to the developed as well as DCs, but it poses 
challenges in quite a divergent way. The challenges the SSA countries face in meeting 
their obligations and enjoying their rights under the SPS Agreement have been immense. 
These range from failure to be represented at the international standard setting 
organisations, through the inadequacy of the special and differential treatment provisions, 
to the poor participation of SSA countries in the DSU. The underlying factor, however, 
has been the lack of adequate resources, both human and financial. But, with the 
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assistance of the developed countries, together with the international trade organisations 
like, the WTO, IMF, WB, UNDP and UNCTAD, the challenges faced by SSA countries 
in fulfilling their obligations have been reduced and perhaps in the future, SSA countries 
are also to fully enjoy the rights under the SPS Agreement through recognising the SDT 
provisions in improving transparency, promoting harmonisation and preventing the 
implementation of stringent SPS measures. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 5  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
________________________________________________________________________ 
5.0    RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Having discussed the application of the SPS Agreement in depth, particularly to the SSA 
countries, now this discussion turns to a highlight of some of the proposed 
recommendations in order for the SSA countries to fully benefit from the rights provided 
for in the SPS Agreement. The recommendations take a two dimensional view, one is an 
amendment of various articles of the Agreement and another building of institutional 
capacities of the SSA countries in order to fulfil their obligations and at the same time 
enjoy their rights under the SPS Agreement. 
5.1    Special and differential Treatment 
First, the SPS Agreement contains a number of vague formulations about the need for 
special and differential treatment of the developing countries, particularly the SSA ones. 
Article 10 of the SPS Agreement should be clarified by the WTO through an appropriate 
amendment. It provides that members shall take account of the special needs of 
developing country members, and in particular of the LDC members, when drafting 
international standards. SSA countries dominate on the list of the list LDCs. 
However, article 10, as it is presently being implemented by the international standard 
setting organisations, creates a double standard for DCs, due to the fact that the 
provisions of article 10.4 are not mandatory.  To correct this problem, instead of lowering 
international standards to levels that are acceptable to SSA countries, developed countries 
can and should be compelled to instead beef up efforts to meet the goals of article 10 by 
organizing international aid to help developing nations meet “world class" standards. 
This can be done by making sure that SSA countries receive special support from 
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developed countries and international organisations in relation to agricultural products of 
particular significance to the SSA countries. 
 
5.1.1     Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Rulings  
 
There is the problem of enforcing panel and appellate body decisions which can be 
solved by reform of the dispute settlement process. For example, financial compensation 
instead of withdrawal of trade preferences should be the penalty for defying trade rules 
by a member state. Alternatively, the punishment could be a collective withdrawal of 
preferences by all member countries instead of one member country. This would help the 
SSA countries due to their lack of ability to retaliate, also due to inadequate resources. 
However, the possibility of collective withdrawal of trade preferences is more unlikely or 
difficult to implement given each country’s trade agendas, nevertheless, if enforced, 
would go a long way towards solving the problem of inadequacy of the available 
remedies to the parties to the DSU especially for the SSA countries. 
 
5.1.2     Harmonisation of SPS measures 
 
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement should be amended with regard to harmonisation of the 
SPS measures adopted by parties. Since most SSA countries have expressed concerns 
about their participation in the international standard setting organisations, and the 
problems faced in complying with the SPS measures, a clear and transparent way of 
adopting international standards should be addressed. This may be done through basing 
the SPS measures on consensus, where countries from different geographical areas and 
levels of development are considered. In addition in case a measure is to affect a certain 
region, say, SSA, then before it is adopted, the countries from that region should be 
afforded an opportunity to be heard and if possible adduce evidence in support for an SPS 
standard.  
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5.1.3    Equivalence not sameness 
 
Article 4.1 recognises that different measures may achieve the same level of SPS 
protection. Thus countries have a certain level of flexibility regarding the kind of 
measures to adopt. However, equivalence has been treated to mean “sameness”.  Due to 
the benefits that would arise from the participation of DCs from bilateral or multilateral 
agreements on recognition of equivalence of SPS measures, developed countries should 
assist where possible to make these agreements work. Thus particular emphasis should be 
put in the setting up of internationally financed regional or sub-regional laboratories, 
certification bodies. I suggest that such institutions should be made to function under the 
auspices of the international standard setting organisations. By doing this, it shall be 
bringing services to the people who need it most, rather than setting standards which 
many of the SSA countries have no idea about. 
5.1.4     Adaptation to regional conditions 
 
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement provides that members shall ensure that their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures are adapted to the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the 
area , whether all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of several countries from 
which the product originated and to which the product is destined. The adaptation to 
regional conditions is of particular relevance to SSA countries, however the procedures to 
prove that some areas are pest or disease free or at low risk are usually long and 
burdensome and often  include the need to provide complex scientific evidence, thus they 
are expensive. In addition, the eradication of specific diseases from an area may require 
considerable investment and there is a need, especially for SSA countries, to establish 
whether they can get appropriate return on their investment. It would not make economic 
sense to invest in an area which is not going to benefit a particular sector or the economy 
as a whole. Thus clear reference should be made in article 6 to the effect that the 
international standard setting organisations and the developed countries should provide 
assistance to DCs especially the SSA in a bid to facilitate the implementation of the 
provisions of the article. 
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5.1.5     Transparency 
 
Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS agreement provide for the transparency of sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations. Member states have to ensure that the SPS measures that are 
adopted have to be published promptly.301 But time should be allowed for SSA countries 
to adopt their products or methods in order to comply with a number of new SPS 
measures. Transparency would go a long way towards ensuring that the SPS Agreement 
works, but, unfortunately for SSA countries, developed countries have chosen to defy the 
provisions relating to transparency by not providing the necessary documentation relating 
to a new measure. But, even if such information is made available, SSA countries 
frequently do not have access to the new standard materials due to a number of reasons 
already mentioned which stem from lack of finances.  
5.1.6     SSA countries initiative 
 
On the other hand, SSA countries can also partially solve the challenges they face under 
the SPS Agreement by setting aside resources to meet their obligations and requirements 
under the SPS Agreement. As discussed earlier, SSA countries lack the resources to 
establish avenues under the SPS Agreement and as such end up not being able to comply 
with the SPS Agreement. This can be done either nationally or on a regional basis. For 
example, if countries in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), 
established a fund specifically for upgrading the SPS measures in their countries, this 
would be a partial solution. The same would go for other regions such as the East and 
West African regions.  
                                                 
301 The SPS Agreement, Article 7 & Item 1 Annex B 
 
 
 
 
 82
5.1.7      The international standard setting bodies 
 
International standards setting bodies should be reformed and/ or developed so as to 
better address the needs of SSA countries. Ways need to be found to facilitate the better 
inclusion of the SSA countries’ operation in the WTO Agreement. To increase their sense 
of ‘ownership’ of the Agreement, revisions to its transparency arrangements may be 
necessary along with greater harmonisation of international SPS standards, changes to the 
decision-making procedures of the international setting organisations and the 
development of mechanisms for legal and or technical assistance relating to SPS matters 
within the context of the WTO.  
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5.2      CONCLUSIONS  
As tariff trade barriers were being reduced, there was a fear that non-tariff barriers to 
trade, including areas concerning human and food safety were to become a hindrance to 
international trade. Thus during the Uruguay Round, the contracting members agreed to 
establish an agreement aimed at the protection of human, animal and plant life and or 
health. This led to the introduction of the SPS Agreement in 1995. Its main aim is to 
protect life and health on one hand as well as promoting international trade on the other. 
The SPS Agreement is a science based agreement but, thus it poses a number of problems 
and challenges for the DCs and especially the SSA states.  
The challenges the SSA countries face in meeting their obligations and enjoying their 
rights under the SPS Agreement have been immense. These range from failure to be 
represented at the international standard setting organisations, through the inadequacy of 
the Special and Differential Treatment provisions in the Agreement to the poor 
participation of SSA countries in the DSU. The underlying factor, however, has been the 
lack of adequate resources, both human and financial. But, with the assistance of the 
developed countries together with some international organisations like the World Bank 
WB, IMF, UNDP and UNCTAD, the challenges faced by the SSA countries in fulfilling 
their obligations have been reduced and perhaps in the future, SSA shall fully enjoy the 
rights under the SPS Agreement through recognition of the SDT provisions in improving 
transparency, promoting harmonisation and preventing the implementation of the SPS 
measures that cannot be scientifically justified.   
 
The SPS agreement has had an enormous impact on international trade, more so from the 
SSA perspective. This is because of a number of daunting challenges and obstacles that 
SSA countries face ranging from compliance with the stringent SPS standards, to the lack 
of adequate resources. Matters are not made any better by the developed countries’ 
technological advancement and sophistication, thus demanding for higher SPS standards. 
Much as there are various considerations for DCs in the SPS Agreement, the language 
used is not obligatory enough, thus in most cases, developed countries have out of choice 
failed to fulfil their part in as far as provision of technical assistance is concerned.   
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If possible, developed countries should support modest amendments to the SPS 
Agreement to ensure that the removal of trade barriers does not erode domestic public 
health standards. Such steps will not only protect consumers or international traders but 
will also help maintain public support for international trade agreements.  
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ANNEXTURE A 
 
AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
MEASURES 
Members 
Reaffirming that no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the requirement that 
these measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail or a 
disguised restriction on international trade;  
Desiring to improve the human health, animal health and phytosanitary situation in all 
Members; 
Noting that sanitary and phytosanitary measures are often applied on the basis of bilateral 
agreements or protocols;  
Desiring the establishment of a multilateral framework of rules and disciplines to guide 
the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in 
order to minimize their negative effects on trade; 
Recognizing the important contribution that international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations can make in this regard;  
Desiring to further the use of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures between 
Members, on the basis of international standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed by the relevant international organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the relevant international and 
regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant 
Protection Convention, without requiring Members to change their appropriate level of 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health; 
Recognizing that developing country Members may encounter special difficulties in 
complying with the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of importing Members, and as a 
consequence in access to markets, and also in the formulation and application of sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures in their own territories, and desiring to assist them in their 
endeavours in this regard;  
Desiring therefore to elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 
which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions 
of Article XX(b) (1);  Hereby agree as follows:  
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Article 1  
General Provisions  
1. This Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly 
or indirectly, affect international trade. Such measures shall be developed and applied in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, the definitions provided in Annex A shall apply.  
3. The annexes are an integral part of this Agreement. 
4. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights of Members under the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade with respect to measures not within the scope of this 
Agreement.  
Article 2 
Basic Rights and Obligations  
1. Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.  
2. Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the 
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific 
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided 
for in paragraph 7 of Article 5. 
3. Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily 
or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions 
prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade. 
4. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of the Members 
under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b). 
Article 3 
Harmonization  
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, 
Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this 
Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. 
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2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement and of GATT 1994. 
3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in 
a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures 
based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a 
scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5.(2) Notwithstanding the above, all 
measures which result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from 
that which would be achieved by measures based on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement.  
4. Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the relevant 
international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the international 
and regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant 
Protection Convention, to promote within these organizations the development and 
periodic review of standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects 
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
5. The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures provided for in paragraphs 1 
and 4 of Article 12 (referred to in this Agreement as the “Committee”) shall develop a 
procedure to monitor the process of international harmonization and coordinate efforts in 
this regard with the relevant international organizations. 
 
Article 4 
Equivalence  
1. Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as 
equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or from those used by other 
Members trading in the same product, if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates 
to the importing Member that its measures achieve the importing Member's appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. For this purpose, reasonable access shall be 
given, upon request, to the importing Member for inspection, testing and other relevant 
procedures. 
2. Members shall, upon request, enter into consultations with the aim of achieving 
bilateral and multilateral agreements on recognition of the equivalence of specified 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures.  
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Article 5  
Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or 
Phytosanitary Protection  
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an 
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant 
life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant 
international organizations. 
2. In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific 
evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and 
testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest — or disease 
— free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other 
treatment. 
3. In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and determining the measure to be 
applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection from 
such risk, Members shall take into account as relevant economic factors: the potential 
damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or 
spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the 
importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to 
limiting risks. 
4. Members should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection, take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects. 
5. With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or 
health, or to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, 
if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade. Members shall cooperate in the Committee, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 
3 of Article 12, to develop guidelines to further the practical implementation of this 
provision. In developing the guidelines, the Committee shall take into account all relevant 
factors, including the exceptional character of human health risks to which people 
voluntarily expose themselves. 
6. Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing or maintaining 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-
restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.(3) 
7. In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally 
adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, 
including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or 
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phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall 
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of 
risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time.  
8. When a Member has reason to believe that a specific sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
introduced or maintained by another Member is constraining, or has the potential to 
constrain, its exports and the measure is not based on the relevant international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations, or such standards, guidelines or recommendations do not 
exist, an explanation of the reasons for such sanitary or phytosanitary measure may be 
requested and shall be provided by the Member maintaining the measure. 
Article 6  
Adaptation to Regional Conditions, Including Pest — or Disease — Free Areas and 
Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence  
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are adapted to the 
sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the area — whether all of a country, part of a 
country, or all or parts of several countries — from which the product originated and to 
which the product is destined. In assessing the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of 
a region, Members shall take into account, inter alia, the level of prevalence of specific 
diseases or pests, the existence of eradication or control programmes, and appropriate 
criteria or guidelines which may be developed by the relevant international organizations.  
2. Members shall, in particular, recognize the concepts of pest — or disease-free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence. Determination of such areas shall be based 
on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and the 
effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls. 
3. Exporting Members claiming that areas within their territories are pest — or disease-
free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence shall provide the necessary evidence 
thereof in order to objectively demonstrate to the importing Member that such areas are, 
and are likely to remain, pest— or disease—free areas or areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence, respectively. For this purpose, reasonable access shall be given, upon request, 
to the importing Member for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures. 
Article 7  
Transparency  
Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary measures and shall 
provide information on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in accordance with the 
provisions of Annex B. 
Article 8  
Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures  
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Members shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the operation of control, inspection 
and approval procedures, including national systems for approving the use of additives or 
for establishing tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or feedstuffs, and 
otherwise ensure that their procedures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
Artilce 9 
Technical Assistance  
1. Members agree to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to other Members, 
especially developing country Members, either bilaterally or through the appropriate 
international organizations. Such assistance may be, inter alia, in the areas of processing 
technologies, research and infrastructure, including in the establishment of national 
regulatory bodies, and may take the form of advice, credits, donations and grants, 
including for the purpose of seeking technical expertise, training and equipment to allow 
such countries to adjust to, and comply with, sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
necessary to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection in their 
export markets.  
2. Where substantial investments are required in order for an exporting developing 
country Member to fulfil the sanitary or phytosanitary requirements of an importing 
Member, the latter shall consider providing such technical assistance as will permit the 
developing country Member to maintain and expand its market access opportunities for 
the product involved. 
Article 10  
Special and Differential Treatment  
1. In the preparation and application of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, Members 
shall take account of the special needs of developing country Members, and in particular 
of the least-developed country Members.  
2. Where the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection allows scope for the 
phased introduction of new sanitary or phytosanitary measures, longer time-frames for 
compliance should be accorded on products of interest to developing country Members so 
as to maintain opportunities for their exports. 
3. With a view to ensuring that developing country Members are able to comply with the 
provisions of this Agreement, the Committee is enabled to grant to such countries, upon 
request, specified, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part from obligations under this 
Agreement, taking into account their financial, trade and development needs. 
4. Members should encourage and facilitate the active participation of developing country 
Members in the relevant international organizations.  
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Article 11  
Consultations and Dispute Settlement  
1. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied 
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement 
of disputes under this Agreement, except as otherwise specifically provided herein. 
2. In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical issues, a panel 
should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to 
the dispute. To this end, the panel may, when it deems it appropriate, establish an 
advisory technical experts group, or consult the relevant international organizations, at 
the request of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the rights of Members under other international 
agreements, including the right to resort to the good offices or dispute settlement 
mechanisms of other international organizations or established under any international 
agreement. 
Article 12  
Administration  
1. A Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is hereby established to provide 
a regular forum for consultations. It shall carry out the functions necessary to implement 
the provisions of this Agreement and the furtherance of its objectives, in particular with 
respect to harmonization. The Committee shall reach its decisions by consensus.  
2. The Committee shall encourage and facilitate ad hoc consultations or negotiations 
among Members on specific sanitary or phytosanitary issues. The Committee shall 
encourage the use of international standards, guidelines or recommendations by all 
Members and, in this regard, shall sponsor technical consultation and study with the 
objective of increasing coordination and integration between international and national 
systems and approaches for approving the use of food additives or for establishing 
tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or feedstuffs. 
3. The Committee shall maintain close contact with the relevant international 
organizations in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, especially with the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the 
Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, with the objective of 
securing the best available scientific and technical advice for the administration of this 
Agreement and in order to ensure that unnecessary duplication of effort is avoided.  
4. The Committee shall develop a procedure to monitor the process of international 
harmonization and the use of international standards, guidelines or recommendations. For 
this purpose, the Committee should, in conjunction with the relevant international 
organizations, establish a list of international standards, guidelines or recommendations 
relating to sanitary or phytosanitary measures which the Committee determines to have a 
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major trade impact. The list should include an indication by Members of those 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations which they apply as conditions 
for import or on the basis of which imported products conforming to these standards can 
enjoy access to their markets. For those cases in which a Member does not apply an 
international standard, guideline or recommendation as a condition for import, the 
Member should provide an indication of the reason therefor, and, in particular, whether it 
considers that the standard is not stringent enough to provide the appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection. If a Member revises its position, following its 
indication of the use of a standard, guideline or recommendation as a condition for 
import, it should provide an explanation for its change and so inform the Secretariat as 
well as the relevant international organizations, unless such notification and explanation 
is given according to the procedures of Annex B. 
5. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the Committee may decide, as appropriate, 
to use the information generated by the procedures, particularly for notification, which 
are in operation in the relevant international organizations. 
6. The Committee may, on the basis of an initiative from one of the Members, through 
appropriate channels invite the relevant international organizations or their subsidiary 
bodies to examine specific matters with respect to a particular standard, guideline or 
recommendation, including the basis of explanations for non-use given according to 
paragraph 4.  
7. The Committee shall review the operation and implementation of this Agreement three 
years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and thereafter as the need 
arises. Where appropriate, the Committee may submit to the Council for Trade in Goods 
proposals to amend the text of this Agreement having regard, inter alia, to the experience 
gained in its implementation.  
Article 13  
Implementation  
Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all obligations 
set forth herein. Members shall formulate and implement positive measures and 
mechanisms in support of the observance of the provisions of this Agreement by other 
than central government bodies. Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well 
as regional bodies in which relevant entities within their territories are members, comply 
with the relevant provisions of this Agreement. In addition, Members shall not take 
measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such 
regional or non-governmental entities, or local governmental bodies, to act in a manner 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall ensure that they rely 
on the services of non-governmental entities for implementing sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures only if these entities comply with the provisions of this Agreement.  
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Article 14  
Final Provisions  
The least-developed country Members may delay application of the provisions of this 
Agreement for a period of five years following the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement with respect to their sanitary or phytosanitary measures affecting importation 
or imported products. Other developing country Members may delay application of the 
provisions of this Agreement, other than paragraph 8 of Article 5 and Article 7, for two 
years following the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement with respect to their 
existing sanitary or phytosanitary measures affecting importation or imported products, 
where such application is prevented by a lack of technical expertise, technical 
infrastructure or resources. 
ANNEX A  
DEFINITIONS (4) 
1. Sanitary or phytosanitary measure — Any measure applied: 
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms;  
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, 
beverages or feedstuffs;  
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising 
from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests; or 
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests.  
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, 
requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and 
production methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; quarantine 
treatments including relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or 
plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on 
relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and 
packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety.  
2. Harmonization — The establishment, recognition and application of common sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures by different Members.  
3. International standards, guidelines and recommendations 
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(a) for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide 
residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of 
hygienic practice;  
(b) for animal health and zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed under the auspices of the International Office of Epizootics;  
(c) for plant health, the international standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed under the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection 
Convention in cooperation with regional organizations operating within the framework of 
the International Plant Protection Convention; and 
(d) for matters not covered by the above organizations, appropriate standards, guidelines 
and recommendations promulgated by other relevant international organizations open for 
membership to all Members, as identified by the Committee. 
4. Risk assessment — The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread 
of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential 
biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse 
effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, 
toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs. 
5. Appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection — The level of protection 
deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.  
NOTE: Many Members otherwise refer to this concept as the “acceptable level of risk”. 
6. Pest— or disease-free area — An area, whether all of a country, part of a country, or 
all or parts of several countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in which a 
specific pest or disease does not occur.  
NOTE: A pest— or disease-free area may surround, be surrounded by, or be adjacent to 
an area — whether within part of a country or in a geographic region which includes 
parts of or all of several countries -in which a specific pest or disease is known to occur 
but is subject to regional control measures such as the establishment of protection, 
surveillance and buffer zones which will confine or eradicate the pest or disease in 
question. 
7. Area of low pest or disease prevalence — An area, whether all of a country, part of a 
country, or all or parts of several countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in 
which a specific pest or disease occurs at low levels and which is subject to effective 
surveillance, control or eradication measures.  
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Annex B 
Transparency of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations  
Publication of regulations 
1. Members shall ensure that all sanitary and phytosanitary regulations (5) which have 
been adopted are published promptly in such a manner as to enable interested Members 
to become acquainted with them. 
2. Except in urgent circumstances, Members shall allow a reasonable interval between the 
publication of a sanitary or phytosanitary regulation and its entry into force in order to 
allow time for producers in exporting Members, and particularly in developing country 
Members, to adapt their products and methods of production to the requirements of the 
importing Member. 
Enquiry points 
3. Each Member shall ensure that one enquiry point exists which is responsible for the 
provision of answers to all reasonable questions from interested Members as well as for 
the provision of relevant documents regarding:  
(a) any sanitary or phytosanitary regulations adopted or proposed within its territory;  
(b) any control and inspection procedures, production and quarantine treatment, pesticide 
tolerance and food additive approval procedures, which are operated within its territory;  
(c) risk assessment procedures, factors taken into consideration, as well as the 
determination of the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection;  
(d) the membership and participation of the Member, or of relevant bodies within its 
territory, in international and regional sanitary and phytosanitary organizations and 
systems, as well as in bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements within the 
scope of this Agreement, and the texts of such agreements and arrangements.  
4. Members shall ensure that where copies of documents are requested by interested 
Members, they are supplied at the same price (if any), apart from the cost of delivery, as 
to the nationals (6) of the Member concerned. 
Notification procedures 
5. Whenever an international standard, guideline or recommendation does not exist or the 
content of a proposed sanitary or phytosanitary regulation is not substantially the same as 
the content of an international standard, guideline or recommendation, and if the 
regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other Members, Members shall: 
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(a) publish a notice at an early stage in such a manner as to enable interested Members to 
become acquainted with the proposal to introduce a particular regulation; 
(b) notify other Members, through the Secretariat, of the products to be covered by the 
regulation together with a brief indication of the objective and rationale of the proposed 
regulation. Such notifications shall take place at an early stage, when amendments can 
still be introduced and comments taken into account; 
(c) provide upon request to other Members copies of the proposed regulation and, 
whenever possible, identify the parts which in substance deviate from international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations;  
(d) without discrimination, allow reasonable time for other Members to make comments 
in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take the comments and the results 
of the discussions into account. 
6. However, where urgent problems of health protection arise or threaten to arise for a 
Member, that Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in paragraph 5 of this 
Annex as it finds necessary, provided that the Member: 
(a) immediately notifies other Members, through the Secretariat, of the particular 
regulation and the products covered, with a brief indication of the objective and the 
rationale of the regulation, including the nature of the urgent problem(s); 
(b) provides, upon request, copies of the regulation to other Members; 
(c) allows other Members to make comments in writing, discusses these comments upon 
request, and takes the comments and the results of the discussions into account. 
7. Notifications to the Secretariat shall be in English, French or Spanish. 
8. Developed country Members shall, if requested by other Members, provide copies of 
the documents or, in case of voluminous documents, summaries of the documents 
covered by a specific notification in English, French or Spanish.  
9. The Secretariat shall promptly circulate copies of the notification to all Members and 
interested international organizations and draw the attention of developing country 
Members to any notifications relating to products of particular interest to them. 
10. Members shall designate a single central government authority as responsible for the 
implementation, on the national level, of the provisions concerning notification 
procedures according to paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Annex. 
General reservations 
11. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as requiring: 
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(a) the provision of particulars or copies of drafts or the publication of texts other than in 
the language of the Member except as stated in paragraph 8 of this Annex; or 
(b) Members to disclose confidential information which would impede enforcement of 
sanitary or phytosanitary legislation or which would prejudice the legitimate commercial 
interests of particular enterprises.  
ANNEX C 
CONTROL, INSPECTION AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES (7) 
1. Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment 
of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that:  
(a) such procedures are undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less 
favourable manner for imported products than for like domestic products;  
(b) the standard processing period of each procedure is published or that the anticipated 
processing period is communicated to the applicant upon request; when receiving an 
application, the competent body promptly examines the completeness of the 
documentation and informs the applicant in a precise and complete manner of all 
deficiencies; the competent body transmits as soon as possible the results of the 
procedure in a precise and complete manner to the applicant so that corrective action may 
be taken if necessary; even when the application has deficiencies, the competent body 
proceeds as far as practicable with the procedure if the applicant so requests; and that 
upon request, the applicant is informed of the stage of the procedure, with any delay 
being explained; 
(c) information requirements are limited to what is necessary for appropriate control, 
inspection and approval procedures, including for approval of the use of additives or for 
the establishment of tolerances for contaminants in food, beverages or feedstuffs;  
(d) the confidentiality of information about imported products arising from or supplied in 
connection with control, inspection and approval is respected in a way no less favourable 
than for domestic products and in such a manner that legitimate commercial interests are 
protected; 
(e) any requirements for control, inspection and approval of individual specimens of a 
product are limited to what is reasonable and necessary;  
(f) any fees imposed for the procedures on imported products are equitable in relation to 
any fees charged on like domestic products or products originating in any other Member 
and should be no higher than the actual cost of the service;  
(g) the same criteria should be used in the seting of facilities used in the procedures and 
the selection of samples of imported products as for domestic products so as to minimize 
the inconvenience to applicants, importers, exporters or their agents;  
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(h) whenever specifications of a product are changed subsequent to its control and 
inspection in light of the applicable regulations, the procedure for the modified product is 
limited to what is necessary to determine whether adequate confidence exists that the 
product still meets the regulations concerned; and 
(i) a procedure exists to review complaints concerning the operation of such procedures 
and to take corrective action when a complaint is justified.  
Where an importing Member operates a system for the approval of the use of food 
additives or for the establishment of tolerances for contaminants in food, beverages or 
feedstuffs which prohibits or restricts access to its domestic markets for products based 
on the absence of an approval, the importing Member shall consider the use of a relevant 
international standard as the basis for access until a final determination is made. 
2. Where a sanitary or phytosanitary measure specifies control at the level of production, 
the Member in whose territory the production takes place shall provide the necessary 
assistance to facilitate such control and the work of the controlling authorities. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from carrying out reasonable 
inspection within their own territories. 
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ANNEXTURE B 
 
 
GATT 1947  
 
Article XX 
 
General Exceptions 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
 
 (a) necessary to protect public morals; 
 
 (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 
 (c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver; 
 
 (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those 
relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated 
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, 
trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
 
 (e) relating to the products of prison labour; 
 
 (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic 
or archaeological value; 
 
 (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption; 
 
 (h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any 
intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria 
submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by 
them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved; 
 
 (i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to 
ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing 
industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials is held 
below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan;  
Provided that such restrictions shall not operate to increase the exports of 
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or the protection afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart 
from the provisions of this Agreement relating to non-discrimination; 
 
 (j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or 
local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be consistent 
with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable 
share of the international supply of such products, and that any such 
measures, which are inconsistent with the other provisions of the 
Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to 
them have ceased to exist.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
